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This project uses the global TIMES Integrated 
Assessment Model in UCL (‘TIAM-UCL’) to provide 
robust quantitative insights into the future of 
natural gas in the energy system and in particular 
whether or not gas has the potential to act as a 
‘bridge’ to a low-carbon future on both a global 
and regional basis out to 2050.
We first explore the dynamics of a scenario that 
disregards any need to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Such a scenario results in a large 
uptake in the production and consumption of all 
fossil fuels, with coal in particular dominating the 
electricity system.  It is unconventional sources of 
gas production that account for much of the rise in 
natural gas production; with shale gas exceeding 
1 Tcm after 2040. Gas consumption grows in 
all sectors apart from the electricity sector, and 
eventually becomes cost effective both as a marine 
fuel (as liquefied natural gas) and in medium-
goods vehicles (as compressed natural gas).
We next examine how different gas market 
structures affect natural gas production, 
consumption, and trade patterns. For the two 
different scenarios constructed, one continued 
current regionalised gas markets, which are 
characterised by very different prices in different 
regions with these prices often based on oil 
indexation, while the other allowed a global 
gas price to form based on gas supply-demand 
fundamentals. We find only a small change in 
overall global gas production levels between these 
but a major difference in levels of gas trade and 
so conclude that if gas exporters choose to defend 
oil indexation in the short-term, they may end up 
destroying their export markets in longer term. A 
move towards pricing gas internationally, based 
on supply-demand dynamics, is thus shown to be 
crucial if they are to maintain their current levels 
of exports. 
Nevertheless, it is also shown that, regardless 
of how gas is priced in the future, scenarios 
leading to a 2oC temperature rise generally have 
larger pipeline and LNG exports than scenarios 
that lead to a higher temperature increase. For 
pipeline trade, the adoption of any ambitious 
emissions reduction agreement results in little 
loss of markets and could (if carbon capture 
and storage is available) actually lead to a much 
greater level of exports.  For LNG trade, because of 
the significant role that gas can play in replacing 
future coal demand in the emerging economies 
in Asia, markets that are largely supplied by LNG 
at present, we demonstrate that export countries 
should actively pursue an ambitious global 
agreement on GHG emissions mitigation if they 
want to expand their exports. These results thus 
have important implications for the negotiating 
positions of gas-exporting countries in the on-
going discussions on agreeing an ambitious global 
agreement on emissions reduction.
The GHG mitigation polices that lead to the largest 
levels of future natural gas consumption are also 
examined. We find that up to 2020, the higher the 
CO2 tax, the greater the level of gas consumption 
globally; however, by 2050, a CO2 tax more 
commensurate with a 3oC temperature rise leads 
to the highest level of gas consumption observed in 
that year in any scenario. This global pattern is not 
observed in all regions, however, and indeed some 
countries such as Canada and India display very 
different behaviour. We further find that CCS has 
an important effect of increasing gas consumption, 
even at low imposed CO2 tax levels.
Turning to the overall role of gas in a low-carbon 
future global energy system. In a scenario that 
provides a 60 per cent chance of limiting the mean 
surface temperature rise to 2oC, gas consumption 
rises until 2035 and indeed is larger than in a 
case with no GHG emissions reductions on a 
global level between 2015 and 2035. We therefore 
conclude that there is a good potential for gas to 
act as a transition fuel to a low-carbon future up 
to 2035. However, there are a number of important 
conditions to this result.
First, the bridging period is strictly time-limited. 
Global gas consumption declines in all years 
after 2035 whilst it continues to rise in scenarios 
leading to higher average temperature rises: any 
increase in near-term periods must be followed by 
a subsequent reduction in later periods. 
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Second, the absolute and relative increase in gas 
consumption (between the scenario limiting the 
temperature rise to 2oC and one with no GHG 
emissions reductions) must occur alongside a 
much greater reduction in coal consumption again 
in both absolute and relative terms. Further, gas is 
only a short-term complement to the much larger 
increase in low-carbon energy sources that must 
occur to replace the reduction in coal consumption 
and for the low-carbon transition actually to be 
achieved. Advocacy of gas as a transition fuel 
therefore needs a convincing narrative as to how 
global coal consumption can be curtailed and be 
replaced by low-carbon, non-gas energy sources. 
Third, carbon capture and storage (CCS) is of 
particular importance. In a 2oC scenario in which 
CCS is not available, gas consumption peaked in 
2025 and declined terminally thereafter: the role 
that gas can as a transition fuel play was thus 
substantially reduced.
Fourth, our definition of the bridging role that 
gas could play partly relies on to the difference in 
gas consumption between a 2oC scenario and a 
scenario with no GHG emission reduction policies. 
In this latter scenario there is a reversal of the 
trend that is currently being exhibited in many 
regions away from coal-based power generation 
and the average surface temperature rise in 
2100 is around 4oC. If we were to compare gas 
consumption in the 2oC scenario with a scenario 
that results in a lower temperature rise, for 
example a 3oC scenario, then the advantage from 
a climate perspective conveyed by consuming 
additional gas is significantly lessened.
The fifth and final caveat is that this global 
pattern is not exhibited by all regions. Gas is able 
to play a bridging role in some regions but not in 
others. Of the 13 regions studied, gas had limited 
or no potential to act as a transition fuel in six 
(Africa, Canada, Central and South America, the 
Middle East and Mexico), a good potential in three 
(Australia, Other Developing Asia, and the United 
States), and a strong potential in four (China, 
Europe, India, and Japan and South Korea). Again 
this is dependent on the availability of CCS, with 
natural gas only remaining a strong bridge in 
China if CCS is not available.
Finally, we find that there is significant and 
widespread growth in shale gas production in 
the future, with little difference in production 
levels under different long-term emissions 
mitigation targets. However, this is sensitive to the 
availability of CCS, to the relative cost assumptions 
of shale gas compared with other conventional 
and unconventional sources, and to the levels 
of fugitive emission that occur during shale 
gas production. These latter two areas require 
significant further research before it can really be 
concluded that shale gas has an important role to 
play in the transition to a low-carbon global energy 
system.
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To date, a number of studies have examined the 
potential for gas to act as a ‘bridge’ or ‘transition 
fuel’ in the United States (see e.g. Moniz et al. 
2010). However, the potential role of natural gas 
on both a global and regional basis, outside of the 
United States, remains unclear. In this project, 
we therefore use the global TIMES Integrated 
Assessment Model in UCL (‘TIAM-UCL’) to provide 
robust quantitative insights into this issue for the 
first time.
1.1  Research questions
TIAM-UCL has previously been used for a number 
of reports focussing on future projections of the 
energy system under varying degrees of GHG 
emissions reduction (e.g. Anandarajah et al. 
2013; Anandarajah & McGlade 2012; Kesicki & 
Anandarajah 2011). GHG emissions are clearly 
central to this project also, but given the focus 
of this project it is useful to understand in detail 
how natural gas and gas markets are modelled in 
TIAM-UCL. We therefore address two additional 
questions to highlight these factors. We focus on 
the transition of the energy system and the supply 
and demand of commodities out to the year 2050.
The three key research questions that are 
addressed in this project are:
1. How do different gas market structures affect 
natural gas production, consumption, and 
trade patterns?
2. What are the conditions and policies that 
lead to the largest levels of future natural gas 
consumption?
3. What are the conditions under which natural 
gas can play a role as a ‘bridging fuel’ to a low-
carbon energy system? 
The remainder of this report can be differentiated 
into two principal parts. The first, incorporating 
Sections 2 and 3, describes in detail the model and 
a number of the modelling assumptions made 
in this work. It will likely be of most interest to 
energy analysts and modellers who want to know 
the details of the model formulation and the 
way in which the results have been derived. The 
second part, incorporating Sections 4 to 7, sets 
out the results of the scenarios implemented and 
the policy implications that can be drawn. It will 
likely be of most interest to energy and gas policy 
analysts and makers and those interested in the 
interaction of gas with the climate agenda.
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The ‘shale gas revolution’ (Stevens 2012) has had 
profound impacts on the outlook for natural gas. 
Indeed many analysts and organisations now view 
natural gas as an attractive ‘bridge’ to a low carbon 
energy system (IPCC WGIII 2014; Stephenson et al. 
2012). This report aims to explore potential roles 
for natural gas in the future global energy system 
out to 2050 and investigates in particular the global 
and regional carbon implications of the ‘profound 
revolution going on in gas’ (Helm 2011).
Whether the widespread use of natural gas will 
increase or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
is dependent on whether it adds to existing and 
projected demand for fossil fuels (e.g. perhaps 
by lowering the overall price of fossil fuels), 
substitutes for higher-carbon fossil fuels (e.g. coal 
or oil), or substitutes for lower-carbon or zero-
carbon energy sources (e.g. nuclear or renewables). 
At the same time, any explicit attempt to reduce 
GHG emissions can be expected to impact 
global and regional levels of gas production and 
consumption as well as having major implications 
for existing trade relationships. For example, any 
demand destruction for gas brought about by 
attempts to reduce emissions in some regions, 
which would be accompanied by a fall in prices, 
may result in increased consumption in others 
(and vice versa).
These relationships are further complicated by a 
number of recent, more geopolitical, events that 
are having a strong influence on projections of 
future gas demand. The disaster at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant led not only to an 
immediate and significant increase in Japanese 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand, but also to a 
number of countries re-evaluating the role nuclear 
power in their future energy systems. There was 
hence an increased demand for alternative sources 
of energy (notably coal and gas) in these countries. 
Conversely, the removal of President Yanukovych 
in Ukraine, and subsequent actions by Russia, has 
led to a renewed determination in Europe to drive 
down gas demand to reduce reliance on Russian 
gas supplies.
The interaction between changes in gas 
consumption and GHG emissions can therefore 
be expected to vary markedly between different 
regions, under different global emission reduction 
targets, as well as depending on the development 
of different technologies (particularly carbon 
capture and storage).
2
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2.1.  Overview of TIAM-UCL
The TIMES Integrated Assessment Model in UCL 
(‘TIAM-UCL’) is a technology-rich, bottom-up, 
whole-system model that minimises energy system 
cost, or maximises social welfare (as explained 
further below) under a number of imposed 
constraints. It models all primary energy sources 
(oil, gas, coal, nuclear, biomass, and renewables) 
from resource production, trade, conversion, and 
sectoral end-use.
TIAM-UCL is based on the ETSAP-TIAM model, a 
linear programming, partial equilibrium energy 
system model developed and maintained by 
the IEA’s Energy Technology Systems Analysis 
Programme (‘ETSAP’) (Loulou & Labriet 2007). The 
16-region TIAM-UCL model, developed under the 
UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) Phase II, has 
broken out the UK from the previous Western 
Europe region in the 15-region ETSAP-TIAM model 
to allow more specific analysis of the UK in a global 
context.
The 16 regions in TIAM-UCL are shown in Figure 1,
with their names and regional abbreviations 
presented in Table 1. For clarity, in much of the 
analysis that follows, we aggregate some of these 
regions together. The proportions of existing 
(as of 2011) electricity generation and primary 
energy supply that are coal, oil, gas, nuclear and 
renewables within each of the regions are outlined 
in the appendix.
Figure 1. Map of TIAM-UCL regions
Table 1. List of regions and abbreviations 
used in this report in the 16 region TIAM-
UCL model
Region Abbreviation
Africa AFR
Australia and New Zealand AUS
Canada CAN
Central and South America CSA
China CHI
Eastern Europe EEU
Former Soviet Union FSU
India IND
Japan JAP
Mexico MEX
Middle East MEA
Other Developing Asia ODA
South Korea SKO
United Kingdom UK
United States USA
Western Europe WEU
UKERC Research Report
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TIAM-UCL is a ‘demand-driven’ model. This means 
that the model must ensure that all energy service 
demands (such as tonnes of production of iron 
and steel or billion passenger vehicle kilometres) 
within all regions are met either by using energy 
conversion devices and technologies or by reducing 
service demand. There are a total of 43 energy 
service demands included in TIAM-UCL, split 
between the transport (with 14 individual energy 
service demands), residential (10), industrial (10), 
commercial (8) and agricultural (1) sectors. 
These energy service demands are exogenously 
specified and are initially derived within each 
region by calibrating to actual 2005 levels using 
the IEA Extended Energy Balances of OECD and 
non-OECD countries (IEA 2013a). Future demand is 
then projected based on an assumed relationship 
of each energy service demand with exogenously 
specified rates of: regional GDP growth, regional 
population growth, GDP/capita, household sizes, or, 
for industry-sub sectors, sectoral contributions to 
GDP. These drivers have been presented in previous 
reports (Kesicki & Anandarajah 2011; Anandarajah 
& McGlade 2012) and more information is available 
online and in Anandarajah et al. 2011.
The objective of TIAM-UCL is to minimise the total 
discounted energy system cost in the standard 
version or maximise societal welfare (the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus) in the elastic 
demand version. The model therefore chooses 
the cost-minimising (or surplus maximising) 
combination of technologies and commodities 
that mean that that all end-use demands are met, 
while ensuring that all other constraints (such as 
keeping GHG emissions below a certain level) are 
not exceeded. Figure 2 presents a schematic of 
the energy flows in TIAM-UCL that can be used to 
satisfy the energy service demands. 
The costs of all production, trade, conversion, 
infrastructure and end-use technologies are 
specified separately within each region in the 
model. The reserve and resource potential of all 
primary energy sources, such as the extraction of 
oil or gas or the production of bio-crops, are taken 
into account through annual or cumulative bounds 
Figure 2. Overview of TIAM-UCL Structure
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(depending on whether or not the sources are 
renewable). These assumptions for natural gas are 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.3 below. All 
commodity prices and how these change over time 
are generated endogenously by the model. 
For all the scenarios run in this project, a 
‘reference’ or ‘base case’ is first formed that 
incorporates no GHG emissions abatement 
requirements. This base case uses the standard 
version of the model that relies upon minimising 
the discounted system cost: this is used to 
generate base ‘supply prices’ for each energy 
service demand in the model. These supply prices 
are the marginal costs, including commodity 
and technology costs, of meeting the demands. 
For the GHG abatement scenarios, constraints 
are introduced and the model then re-run using 
the elastic-demand version. This version of the 
model maximises social welfare and allows the 
energy service demands to respond to changes 
in the supply prices that result from these new 
constraints. All scenarios in this project are run 
with perfect foresight.
The base year of TIAM-UCL is 2005, and so all costs 
and prices reported in this report are in US$2005 
unless otherwise noted. The total discounted 
energy system cost relies upon a social discount 
rate of 3.5 per cent discounted back to this base-
year (HM Treasury 2003).
The energy system portion of the model is run 
in five-year increments up to 2050 and ten-year 
increments thereafter up to 2100, however the 
climate module (see Section 2.2) alone continues 
out to 2200. An advantage of using a long-term 
energy system model is that it is possible to run 
the model for much longer periods than reported 
in results: path dependency means that costs 
and emissions reductions after the final date for 
which results are reported will affect results prior 
to that date. This allows the model to take into 
account the long-term implications of ‘locking in’ 
various energy system configurations, such as the 
near-term investment in new coal or gas power 
infrastructure. 
2.2  Greenhouse gas accounting and climate 
module
The relationships between changes in GHG 
emissions, changes in atmospheric concentrations 
of these gases, changes in radiative forcing, and 
the change in temperature of the earth’s climate 
are extremely complex. Solving the equations that 
aim to represent and capture these relationships 
is difficult and requires huge computing power. 
Since TIAM-UCL is an energy systems model and 
not a climate model these complex equations are 
simplified significantly.
The climate module in TIAM-UCL is therefore 
calibrated to the MAGICC climate model 
(Meinshausen et al. 2011). This module contains 
simplified equations that model the concentrations 
of three different GHGs with strong global warming 
potential: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) 
and Nitrous oxide (N2O). The module tracks the 
accumulation of anthropogenic emissions in 
the atmosphere and calculates the change in 
radiative forcing resulting from the modification of 
atmospheric concentrations of these GHGs. Finally, 
on a global scale, the climate module can calculate 
the realised temperature change resulting from the 
change in radiative forcing. 
MAGICC provides the 60 per cent probability 
of long-term stabilisation at average surface 
temperature rises. In this project, the climate 
module is used to constrain the model to certain 
bounds on temperature rise, and so these will also 
correspond to a 60 per cent probability of being 
achieved. 
For example, policy makers have agreed that the 
global average surface temperature should not 
exceed 2oC over the long-term (UNFCCC 2012; 
UNFCCC 2009). In many of the scenarios below 
we therefore constrain the model to ensure that 
the temperature rise by 2200 (which we interpret 
here to be the ‘long-term’) is not greater than 
2oC. In these scenarios there is therefore around 
a 60 per cent probability that the global average 
surface temperature will be below 2oC and a 40 
per cent probability that it will be above 2oC. These 
probabilities should not be interpreted too rigidly, 
however. There are other GHGs apart from CO2, 
CH4 and N2O, such as F-gases and volatile organic 
compounds (VOC’s), which are not explicitly 
modelled within TIAM-UCL, and, as noted, the 
climate module is a much simplified version of the 
climate system. 
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In the following scenarios, GHG (i.e. both CO2 and 
non-CO2) emissions are generally constrained on 
a global level. A further assumption is that GHG 
emissions permits can be traded between any 
region in the model from 2020 onwards1. This 
means that there is a truly global effort to reach 
the required level of emission reduction, with the 
model always choosing the most cost effective 
region in which to reduce emissions. Since the 
model endogenously generates the marginal 
cost of mitigating CO2, equivalent to a CO2 tax 
commensurate with a certain level of emissions 
reduction, in this situation there would be a single, 
global price of CO2.
This situation contrasts with exogenously imposing 
regional reduction targets and not allowing 
emissions trading. In this case regions would 
effectively be acting in competition for low-carbon 
commodities, there would be regionally different 
CO2 prices reflecting the cost or ease of reaching 
the required levels of emissions reduction, and 
overall energy system costs would be higher2. We 
use the former of these two approaches as we are 
interested in the most cost effective manner in 
which to limit the temperature target to 2oC (or 
other levels as discussed below).
2.3  Modelling natural gas in TIAM-UCL
2.3.1  Gas production
There are a total of eight categories of 
‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ gas modelled 
in TIAM-UCL: current conventional proved 
and probable (2P) reserves that are in fields in 
production or are scheduled to be developed, 
reserve growth, undiscovered gas, Arctic gas, 
associated gas, tight gas, coal-bed methane, 
and shale gas. Here, the latter three of these are 
collectively referred to as the unconventional gases 
(McGlade et al. 2013b).
Reserve growth is defined to be ‘the commonly 
observed increase in recoverable resources in 
previously discovered fields through time’ (Klett & 
Schmoker 2003). Quantities in this category include 
any contributions from: reserves in fields that 
have been discovered but are not scheduled to be 
developed (often called ‘fallow fields’ or ‘stranded 
UKERC Research Report
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gas’), the implementation of new advanced 
production technologies, changes in geological 
understanding, and changes in regional definitions.
Tight gas is gas trapped in relatively impermeable 
hard rock, limestone or sandstone, coal-bed 
methane is gas trapped in coal seams that is 
adsorbed in the solid matrix of the coal, and shale 
gas is gas trapped in the fabric of fine-grained 
shale.
Each of the above categories is modelled separately 
within the regions listed in Table 1. The resources 
and costs of gas extraction are also specified 
separately for members of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) within each 
relevant region giving a total of 19 regions for 
which resources and production costs are specified. 
The reserve and resource volumes and costs have 
been derived as described in detail in McGlade 
(2013). Briefly, they rely on the construction of 
individual supply cost curves within each region 
for each of the eight categories listed above. These 
are then converted into three ‘cost elements’, 
each with a weighted-average cost of the resource 
they comprise, for input into TIAM-UCL. Figure 3 
displays the overall global supply curves for all 
sources of gas that are included in TIAM-UCL, 
and Figure 4 the ‘cost elements’ for shale gas, 
separated by region. Associated gas is modelled 
as a by-product of crude oil but cumulative 
constraints are imposed on its availability. The 
model is free to choose whether or not to develop 
crude oil fields with or without associated gas3. 
Sour gas and deepwater gas are modelled as part 
of the conventional resources and are available 
at higher costs: these tend therefore to increase 
the average costs of the resource elements for 
each category. Regional gas prices are generated 
endogenously within the model. These incorporate 
the marginal cost of production, scarcity rents and 
rents arising from other imposed constraints, and 
transportation costs. 
A new key aspect of TIAM-UCL recently introduced 
is the imposition of asymmetric constraints on the 
rate of production of oil and gas given a certain 
level of resource availability. These are intended to 
represent ‘depletion rate constraints’.
1 If only a single, global target to mitigate emissions is imposed, there is no need to trade emissions 
permits between regions as they are all working in conjunction. This assumption is therefore only 
important if there are individual regional emission reduction constraints imposed as these regions would 
need to mitigate domestically. For some of the scenarios discussed in Section 3.3, region-specific emissions 
reductions are introduced up to 2015, following the pledges made as part of the Copenhagen Accord.
2 This is true unless the regional targets chosen happen to match exactly the regional levels of emissions 
reduction that the model endogenously selects when imposing the global emissions reduction target. 
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In TIAM-UCL, they are modelled through 
introducing maximum annual production growth 
and maximum ‘decline rate’ restrictions. They are 
imposed on each cost element of each category of 
gas in each region, and ensure that the production 
follows a more realistic profile over time.
In each region, production of each cost element 
of each category of gas can initially increase in 
any given five year period at a maximum value of 
0.5 to 1 per cent of the total resource potential of 
that element (this is called the ‘seed value’). This 
is subsequently allowed to double every two years. 
Slower rates of increase are obviously allowed if 
desired but this describes the maximum rate at 
which production can grow over time.
Decline rates are defined to be ‘how rapidly the 
production from different categories of field is 
declining and how this may be expected to change 
in the future’ (Sorrell et al. 2012). The decline rate 
constraints introduced into TIAM-UCL are slightly 
more complex. When measuring the average 
decline rate for a group of fields, it is important to 
distinguish between: (i) the ‘overall’ or ‘observed’ 
decline rate, (ii) the ‘post-peak’ decline rate, and 
(iii) the ‘natural decline rate’.
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Figure 4. Global supply cost curve for 
shale gas
Source: McGlade (2013)
3 Associated gas is however included in Figure 3 for illustrative purposes so that 
the fully resource potential is displayed. In this figure, it is assigned the costs of 
the resource to which it most closely corresponds in each region: for example 
associated gas reserves in the UK are assigned the costs of UK gas reserves. 
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Figure 3. Global supply cost curve for all gas split by category and region
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The observed decline is the decline in production 
seen in all currently producing fields including 
those that have yet to pass their peak. The post-
peak decline refers to the decline seen just from 
the subset of fields that are themselves in decline. 
Finally, the natural decline is the rate at which 
production from any field would decline in the 
absence of any additional capital investment.
The increases in production from new capital 
investment for a particular resource in a particular 
region are determined endogenously within 
TIAM-UCL and so the ‘natural’ decline rate is the 
most appropriate to use to specify production 
constraints in TIAM-UCL. 
Natural decline rates were generated for each 
region as described by McGlade (2013) and are 
specified as constraints in TIAM-UCL in the form of 
equal maximum annual reductions. This results in 
compound decline over time. For example, say the 
decline rate of a given region is 4 per cent. In a ten 
year period, production can fall to no more than 
66 per cent of its initial production (1-0.9610 = 66 
per cent). The model is free to choose to decline at 
less than the specified rate or to grow production 
(subject to the growth constraint). It can do so, 
however, only if the resource remaining after any 
increase is sufficient to allow it to decline at no 
greater rate than the specified maximum in each 
subsequent year over the remaining time horizon. 
These growth and decline constraints are imposed 
on each resource element of each category of gas 
within each region. 
Estimates of shale gas decline rates are currently 
a source of controversy, with some commentators 
suggesting that future decline rates have been 
underestimated, i.e. that production from 
shale gas wells is declining at a faster rate than 
assumed by many analysts (Berman & Pittinger 
2011; Berman 2010). An extended discussion of 
this issue is provided in McGlade et al. (2013a), 
but it is nevertheless generally accepted that 
production from shale gas wells (and the other 
two unconventional sources) declines at a much 
faster rate than conventional wells. For example, 
within one year production from shale gas wells 
can decline by around 50 per cent from the levels 
seen in the first month or so, while decline rates 
for conventional sources tend be closer to around 5 
per cent every year (IEA 2009). For the modelling of 
the depletion rate constraints within TIAM-UCL, we 
therefore assume different decline rates between 
conventional and unconventional gas. 
2.4  Gas Trade
The gas trade module of TIAM-UCL specifies 
the costs, efficiencies, associated emissions and 
constraints of the trading of gas by both pipeline 
and liquefied natural gas (LNG). This has been 
substantially revised as part of this project. This 
section contains the assumptions and sources 
behind these modifications; these have been made 
in conjunction with, and to reflect the findings of, 
the UK Energy Research Centre project on Global 
Gas Security (see www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/
RF3LGasSecurity). 
2.4.1  Pipeline
Pipeline trade is not a perfectly efficient transport 
mechanism and gas is lost while it is being 
transported by two mechanisms. First, compressor 
stations are located at various intervals along a 
pipeline to maintain pressure to allow the efficient 
flow of gas.
These, for example, reduce surface tension with 
the inside of the pipe, or allow the gas to flow 
uphill. Compressor stations require electricity to 
operate, and the majority of this is generated by 
extracting and combusting a proportion of the 
through-flow of gas. Any such gas will obviously be 
lost and results in some CO2 emissions. 
Second, some gas is leaked during transport. Leaks 
occur both as gas is flowing through compressor 
stations, and by accident along pipelines as it is 
being transported. Research indicates that it is the 
former of these that accounts for the majority of 
the vented emissions (Picard 2000; IEA 2006). Any 
gas lost by either of these mechanisms will result 
in CH4 emissions to the atmosphere. Consequently, 
the quantity of gas entering a pipeline will not 
equal the volume exiting; with some losses to CO2 
(from use in compressor stations) and some to CH4.
This section therefore briefly sets out the 
assumptions and data sources used to estimate 
gas lost in pipeline transport, and the proportion 
of this that is emitted as CO2 and as CH4. This is 
done separately for intra-regional and longer-range 
inter-regional transport.
The IEA (2013a) provides data on the volumes 
of gas lost in transit in 2010 within regions. If 
these values are divided by the volumes that are 
produced (also provided), this yields an estimate of 
the percentage of gas produced that is lost in intra-
regional transmission and distribution. Examples 
are 3.2 per cent in the United States and 7 per cent 
in the former Soviet Union. 
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Estimates for inter-regional transport figures are 
slightly more complex, however. The first aim is to 
estimate the percentage of gas lost per km per unit 
volume flowing through large-scale pipelines. This 
can then be converted into a total percentage loss 
by multiplying it by assumed lengths of pipelines 
between regions (also set out below).
This first step focuses on compressor stations. 
The EIA (2007) provides data on the electricity 
requirements of compressor stations on eleven 
transmission pipelines within the United States. 
These data, and how they are manipulated, are 
summarised in Table 2. To summarise, each 
compressor is estimated to require 0.56 MW 
electricity per million cubic metres (mcm) flowing 
through each day. By assuming that there is one 
compressor station every 150 km (NETL 2012), 
and an electrical conversion efficiency of 38 per 
cent (from the IEA 2006)4, it can be estimated 
that around 2.28 x 10-5 per cent of gas entering a 
pipeline is lost for every kilometre it travels. As 
mentioned above this is emitted as CO2, and is 
converted at 2.1 ktCO2 per mcm gas consumed.
Regarding gas lost as CH4, NETL (2012) indicates 
that based on EPA emission data from 2003 in 
the USA, the volume lost both from operations at 
compressor stations and as the gas flows along the 
pipelines (i.e. through accidental leaks), is 5.4 x 10-6 
per cent/km of pipeline. Gas lost in this way results 
in 678 tCH4 per mcm gas vented. Taken together, 
a total of 2.82 x 10-5 per cent of gas entering a 
pipeline is therefore lost for every km it travels.
The next stage is to estimate the costs of 
constructing and operating new pipelines. 
Cobanli (2014) provides length, capacity, and cost 
estimates for a number of pipelines, which are set 
out in Table 3. To this we have added the recent 
Nordstream pipeline (Chyong et al. 2010). Trade 
process costs in TIAM-UCL are calculated per unit 
of gas transported, and we convert our estimate 
to an average cost per km and per unit of gas, 
giving $335/mcm.km (in 2005$). Operating costs 
are simply assumed to be 2 per cent of the capital 
investment per year (Core Energy Group 2012), with 
each pipeline assumed to have a lifetime of 
40 years.
4 We have taken the average compressor efficiency from OECD countries and apply this to all 
transmission pipelines regardless of start and end region. This relies upon the assumption that 
both existing and new long range transmission pipelines will rely upon more efficient compressor 
stations rather than take the current average efficiency, which is generally somewhat lower. 
Table 2. Percentage of gas lost in pipeline transport that is emitted as CO2
Pipeline 
number
Number 
of stations
Total power 
capacity (MW) Total throughout (mcm/day) MW/(mcm/d)
1 123 1,091 1,978 0.55
2 326 4,049 9,055 0.45
3 195 1,989 3,763 0.53
4 164 1,428 2,464 0.58
5 90 1,149 2,389 0.48
6 49 668 1,236 0.54
7 93 1,199 2,419 0.50
8 25 181 333 0.54
9 4 35 48 0.72
10 43 358 628 0.57
11 89 440 658 0.67
Average 0.56 MW/(mcm/d.comp)
150 km compressor spacing 3.7E-03 MW/(mcm/d.km)
Power required (Khalaji 2012) 4.8E-03 MW/(mcm/d.km)
At 38% compressor efficiency 2.3E-05 per cent gas lost/km
Source: Manipulation of EIA (2007) data
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To provide an example, consider a 2000 km pipeline 
transporting 30 Bcm/year. The above assumptions 
input to TIAM-UCL would be that capital costs are 
$20 billion and the operating costs $400 million/
year. A total of 5.6 per cent of the gas transported 
(1.7 billion cubic metres (Bcm)) would be lost every 
year. Of this, 1.4 Bcm would be combusted and 
result in 2,900 ktCO2 and the remainder (0.3 Bcm) 
would be vented, resulting in 220 ktCH4. Total GHG 
emissions would therefore be around 8.5 MtCO2e.
The next stage is to estimate viable pipeline routes 
between different regions and reasonable distances 
for these. These are shown in Table 4 for each of 
the 16 regions given previously in Table 1; if there 
is no entry in a row or column then pipeline trade 
is not possible between these regions.
A final variable that needs to be estimated 
for pipeline trade is any constraints on the 
construction of new pipelines. The most 
transparent manner in which to impose such 
a constraint is to examine historical rates of 
increase in trade between regions and use this to 
set a maximum limit on the rate at which new 
pipelines can be constructed. Figure 5 thus shows 
the increases in inter-regional pipeline trade over 
the past 13 years, with negative figures indicating 
imports and positive figures exports. Note that this 
is not net trade, rather the total volumes either 
entering or exiting each of the regions by pipeline. 
Build-rate constraints within TIAM-UCL can be 
imposed either as a maximum annual percentage 
increase (which was used for the constraining the 
growth of production of natural gas as discussed 
in Section 2.3.1) or as a maximum absolute 
increase within a 5-year period. For pipeline trade, 
a maximum absolute increase is likely a more 
appropriate constraint since investments tend to 
be on a large-scale basis rather than incremental.
Figure 5 shows that the largest increase in either 
imported or exported gas in any region in any 
5-year period is 36 Bcm (exports from the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU) between 2006 and 2011). This 
is therefore used as the maximum increase in 
pipeline trade in any 5-year period between any 
regions and effectively means that a maximum of 
one new 36 Bcm pipeline can be constructed every 
5 years for any of the pipelines given in Table 4. It 
is also worth noting that a proposed deal between 
Russia and China on pipeline gas (see e.g. Mazneva 
2014) would add 38 Bcm of trade between these 
two countries over a similar timeframe and so is in 
line with the constraint used here. 
2.4.2  Liquefied Natural Gas 
Transport of gas as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
involves three steps – liquefaction, transport and 
re-gasification. Liquefaction is an energy intensive 
process as it requires the gas to be cooled to 
162ºC (-260ºF) to become a liquid. The gas flowing 
to the facility is generally used to provide this 
energy and as a result around 11 per cent of the 
gas is consumed during liquefaction (Herrmann 
et al. 2013), although this percentage does vary  
seasonally and regionally due to differences in 
ambient temperatures. Since this gas is used as a 
feedstock fuel, the resultant emissions are CO2.
Construction of LNG liquefaction terminals is also 
very expensive, with their capital costs having 
increased markedly in recent years from $0.3bn/
million tonnes (Mt) LNG capacity in 2000 to  
$1.2bn/Mt in 2013 (Songhurst 2014). For simplicity, 
we assume a single figure slightly below the peak 
cost within all regions of $1bn/Mt of LNG capacity; 
this is similar to the figure given by Herrmann et al. 
(2013), and is equivalent to around $0.7/m3 natural 
gas liquefied (after losses).
Table 3. Pipeline capacity, length and cost data (Cobanli 2014; Chyong et al. 2010)
Route Status Capacity (Bcm/year)
Length
(km)
Cost 
(2005$ billion) $/(mcm.km)
South Stream Proposed 63 900 17 300
TTP Extension 15 2775 11 265
Trans Caspian Proposed 20 300 4 670
Nabucco-West Cancelled 10 1329 6 440
Trans Adriatic (TAP) Proposed 10 867 4 450
Trans Anatolian (TANAP) Proposed 16 2000 6 180
Turkmenistan-China Operational 30 1833 11 200
Nordstream Operational 55 1222 17-21 254-310
Average 384
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Re-gasification facilities are less expensive and 
less energy intensive, and Herrmann et al. (2013) 
indicate that they cost $200mn/Mt of LNG capacity 
(around $0.1/m3 natural gas processed) and 
consume 1 per cent of the gas received – this is 
again released as CO2.
Seaborne LNG is a much more flexible trade 
process than pipeline trade since it can be used 
over longer distances and between any regions. 
Consequently there are many more possible trade 
routes. Table 5 summarises the locations of the 
liquefaction and re-gasification facilities assumed 
in each region in TIAM-UCL, and Table 6 calculates 
sailing distances between each. The liquefaction 
and re-gasification terminals are not necessarily 
the same in each region. Again if there is no 
entry in row or column then trade is not possible 
between these.
These distances are important not only from a 
cost perspective but also because some of the gas 
that is being transported ‘boils-off’ from the LNG 
ship and is lost. In general (particularly at present 
with such a large price differential between gas 
and heavy fuel oil) this is used to power the ships, 
where technically feasible. Clarkson Research 
Services (2011) indicates that LNG ships travel at 
a speed of 19 knots and so these distances can be 
converted to number of days travel. It is assumed 
that all ships are 145,000 m3 (carrying around 65 
kt LNG or 90 mcm gas) with hire-rates of $100 k/d, 
and have a boil off rate of 0.15 per cent per day 
(Herrmann et al. 2013). It is additionally assumed 
that each journey requires two days for loading 
and unloading, which increases costs and gas lost 
slightly.
As an example, the route from the Middle East 
(Qatar) to China (Fujian) is 5,625 nautical miles 
(10,500 km). Including loading and unloading 
times, this journey takes 14 days in total. Besides 
the capital investments for the liquefaction 
and re-gasification plants, this will cost $15.5/
thousand cubic metres (kcm) gas transported. 
Adding in depreciated capital costs for these plants 
yields transportation costs of around $90/kcm. 
With 2.1 per cent gas lost during transport, and 
taking account of the compounded losses during 
liquefaction and re-gasification, in total 13.8 per 
cent of the gas is also lost. 
Since LNG trade is more flexible than pipeline 
transport, build rate constraints are somewhat 
less important. Nevertheless, given their capital-
intensive nature and long construction time, any 
liquefaction plants that will be constructed before 
2018 will have already been announced. Plants 
that have been constructed, are in construction, or 
have been announced are therefore used to set the 
upper bound on the construction of new facilities 
up to 2018. The model can, however, choose not to 
invest in projects that have been announced but 
not yet constructed if they are not cost effective.
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-200
-100
0
100
200
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500
Figure 5. Historical inter-regional pipeline 
trade between TIAM-UCL regions between 
1998 and 2011
Source: BP Statistical Review (1998-2013)
Table 5. Assumed ports within each region 
for LNG liquefaction and re-gasification.
Liquefaction Re-gasification
AFR Algeria (Skikda) Algeria (Skikda)
AUS Australia (Dampier) Australia (Dampier)
CAN Canada (Kitimat) Canada (Canaport)
CHI China (Fujian) China (Fujian)
CSA Trinadad & Tobago(Point Fortin) Argentina (Bahia Blanca)
EEU Poland (Swinoujscie) Poland (Swinoujscie)
FSU Russia (Sakhalin) Russia (Sakhalin)
IND Indonesia (Dahej) Indonesia (Dahej)
JPN - Japan (Sodegaura)
MEA Qatar (Ras Laffan) Kuwait (Mina Al Ahmadi)
MEX Mexico (Ensenada) Mexico (Ensenada)
ODA Malaysia (Bintulu) Thailand (Map Ta Phut)
SKO - South Korea (Inchon)
UK - UK (Milford Haven)
USA USA (Sabine) USA (Sabine)
WEU Norway (Melkoya) Belgium (Zeebrugge)
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This section describes the key assumptions 
within scenarios implemented in this project to 
investigate the questions posed in Section 1.1.
As discussed in Section 2.1, the base year of TIAM-
UCL is 2005. For the scenarios that require some 
level of GHG emissions reduction, the model 
is therefore free to take actions to reduce GHG 
emissions from 2005 onwards. However, despite the 
Kyoto protocol and other political commitments to 
reduce emissions, observed global GHG emissions 
between 2005 and present have not been following 
the trajectory generally produced in mitigation 
scenarios. It is thus somewhat unreasonable to 
allow the model to do this. In contrast, the results 
from scenarios run that require no GHG abatement 
actually match observed investment patterns and 
GHG emissions quite closely. 
To prevent mitigation that has not been observed 
in reality, the results (infrastructure investments, 
resource extraction etc.) from scenarios that 
require no GHG emissions reduction between 2005 
and 2010 are used in all scenarios regardless of 
the level of emissions mitigation they require. This 
increases the difficulty (and hence cost) of meeting 
emissions reduction and also effectively shifts the 
base year of the model to 2010. 
As also noted in Section 2.1, the scenarios that 
require no GHG emissions reductions are also used 
to generate ‘base prices’ for each commodity in 
each year. These are the marginal commodity costs 
calculated when meeting the fixed energy services 
demands in the standard version of the model, 
which relies upon minimising discounted energy 
system costs. For the GHG mitigation scenarios, 
however, the model is run using the elastic-
demand version. This allows demands to respond 
to changes in the prices of meeting the energy 
service demands that result from the introduction 
of the new emissions constraints.
A summary of all of the scenarios run in this 
project along with a brief description of their key 
assumptions is provided in the Appendix.
3.1  Gas price development
The first set of scenarios aims to help inform the 
first research question, namely the implications of 
different future developments of the gas market. 
Figure 6 presents representative gas prices in the 
three major gas ‘hubs’ since 1996 (North America, 
Europe, and Japan). It can be seen that despite 
relatively close correlation up to 2008, there has 
been a large divergence in annual average gas 
prices since then. This has arisen for a variety 
of reasons (see Allsopp et al. (2012) for details), 
of which one of the most important is that in 
some parts of the world the gas price is wholly 
or partially indexed to the oil price. The different 
prices, as shown in Figure 6, which result from the 
different pricing mechanisms in the world, means 
that there is no ‘global’ gas price similar to that 
for crude oil. Whether such a global gas price will 
develop in the future is uncertain at present, and 
the implications of this are worth investigating. 
Scenarios with two alternative gas market 
structures are therefore implemented. The first 
assumes a continuation of the current situation, 
with a price differential between the three major 
regional gas hubs, which is independent of the 
marginal costs of supplying gas to these regions, 
and is given the suffix _REGIONALGP. The second 
scenario represents a counterfactual to this i.e. 
with a move towards a ‘global gas price’ and is 
given the suffix _GLOBALGP.
The GLOBALGP scenarios are easily constructed 
as they do not require the introduction of any 
additional constraints or exogenous price changes. 
As a global supply and demand equilibrium 
model, the endogenously generated prices rely 
solely upon marginal costs of production, scarcity 
rents and transportation costs. No further factors 
such as gas-to-oil differentials influence prices 
and so a global gas market is likely to form over 
time. This is not to say that the gas price will be 
equal everywhere: the costs of LNG transport 
(the principal mechanism by which a global gas 
22
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Figure 6. Annual average gas prices in the 
United States, UK and Japan
Source: BP Statistical Review (BP 2013)
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price could form) are very expensive, and so price 
differentials will likely remain between regions 
depending on the dynamics of gas trade. 
To represent the current situation, in which prices 
are more divorced from supply-demand dynamics, 
the REGIONALGP scenario imposes some additional 
cost mark ups to gas trade between certain regions. 
An extra cost is added to any gas being traded 
(by either pipeline or LNG) into any of the Asian 
basin regions or into any of the European basin 
regions. This additional cost is added regardless 
of the source of the gas, so, for example, it will be 
introduced for a trade even within the Asian basin 
(e.g. ODA to CHI). To reflect the current differential 
in prices between regions, this price mark-up is 
larger for gas flowing into Asian basin regions than 
European as set out in Table 7. 
The cost mark-ups of $5/GJ (around $5.3/MMBTU 
or $185/kcm) and $3/GJ (around $3.2/MMBTU 
$110/kcm) have been chosen to reflect the historic 
average differentials seen between Henry Hub 
prices and Japan and NBP since around 2008. A 
more appropriate derivation would require an 
investigation of past LNG prices and volumes to 
estimate the differentials that arise over and above 
the actual marginal costs of supply. This is outside 
the scope of this research, but the chosen mark-
ups will still demonstrate the effects such changes 
can have, and as mentioned do reflect the historic 
average differentials. These cost mark ups are not 
applied to gas produced domestically. 
3.2  How gas consumption varies with GHG 
mitigation
The next area that this report seeks to address 
is how gas production and consumption varies 
over time with different GHG mitigation policies.  
The simplest method by which to examine this is 
through imposing a large number of differing CO2 
taxes. We therefore introduce a range of CO2 taxes 
in 2050 and project these forwards and backwards 
at the global discount rate (3.5 per cent).
The CO2 taxes that are introduced in 2050 range 
from $0/tCO2 to $500/tCO2, with scenarios run 
in iterations of $20/tCO2. A total of 25 runs are 
therefore implemented. Some examples of these 
are given in Figure 7. In each of these cases, the 
CO2 tax is first imposed in 2015, with the model 
constrained to a case with no CO2 taxes up to 2010. 
As noted in Section 2.1, all prices are given here in 
2005 US$.
Gas price formation based on gas supply-demand 
fundamentals is a more natural assumption within 
a global optimisation model such as TIAM-UCL, 
since, as mentioned above, it does not required the 
imposition of any additional cost differentials or 
constraints.
Table 7. Cost differentials added in the REGIONALGP scenarios
No cost mark up for gas traded 
into regions
$3/GJ cost mark up for gas traded 
into regions
$5/GJ cost mark up for gas traded 
into regions
AFR EEU CHI
AUS UK IND
CAN WEU JPN
CSA ODA
FSU SKO
MEX
MEA
USA
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and how these vary over time
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Therefore, unless otherwise noted, these scenarios 
do not impose the cost markups used in the 
REGIONALGP scenario and so they carry the 
assumption that there is a move towards a global 
gas price.
3.3  Natural gas as a transition fuel
The third and final area of interest regards the 
role that natural gas can play in a low-carbon 
energy system. To investigate this, we run discrete 
scenarios that result in certain levels of average 
global temperature rise. The definition used here 
for a ‘low-carbon’ future is an emissions pathway 
that is consistent with keeping the global average 
surface temperature rise below 2oC in all years: 
the level agreed on by makers that should not 
exceeded (UNFCCC 2012; UNFCCC 2009). As 
discussed in the previous section, since the climate 
module of TIAM-UCL is calibrated to the MAGICC 
model, there will be around a 60 per cent chance of 
keeping the temperature rise to this level.
We are also interested in examining scenarios that 
do not mitigate the temperature rise to this level. 
This is partly because the IEA (2011) suggests that 
its ‘golden age of gas’ scenario, a scenario that 
modelled a large increase in gas consumption, 
will lead to a 3.6oC average surface temperature 
rise, and partly to allow us to investigate changes 
in gas’s role in when the temperature change 
exceeds the 2oC threshold. We therefore also 
model emissions pathways that lead to long-term 
temperature rises of 3oC and 5oC. ‘Long term’ is 
taken here to mean the temperature rise in 2200, 
and we constrain the model to ensure that these 
temperature targets are not exceeded in any 
time period i.e. no ‘overshoot’ of temperature is 
permitted within the modelling period. 
There are a wide variety of emissions pathways 
consistent with these temperature rises. The focus 
here is not specifically on emissions trajectories, 
however, and so we have chosen discrete scenarios 
with the assumptions set out in Table 8. For the 
emissions-mitigation scenarios (those that limit 
Table 8. Description of assumptions for the discrete emissions reduction scenarios 
Scenario Name Description
REF
The model is constrained to keep the average global surface temperature rise to less than 
5oC in all years to 2200. No other emissions constraints are imposed.
Since allowed emissions under this scenario are so high (i.e. the constraint is very lax), up 
to 2050 this scenario is almost identical to the scenario with a $0/tCO2 tax from Section 
3.2. The temperature rise in 2100 is close to 4oC.
3DS
From 2005 to 2010, the model is fixed to the solution given in REF, i.e. we assume that no 
emissions reductions are required.
From 2010-2015, it is assumed that the model must be on track to achieve the emissions 
reduction pledges set out in the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009), but no other 
emissions reductions are required.
From 2015 onwards the model must meet the Copenhagen Accord emissions reductions in 
2020, and emissions must be such as to keep the average global surface temperature rise 
below 3oC in all years to 2200.
2DS
The constraints between 2005 and 2015 in this scenario are identical to the 3DS.
From 2015 onwards the model must meet the Copenhagen Accord emissions reductions in 
2020, and emissions must be such as to keep the average global surface temperature rise 
below 2oC in all years to 2200.
25
the temperature rise to 3oC and 2oC), we assume 
that there are only relatively modest efforts to 
limit emissions in early periods as explained. As 
with the scenarios in the previous section, these 
scenarios assume a move towards a global gas 
price unless specified otherwise.
A key assumption in TIAM-UCL is the availability 
of carbon capture and storage (CCS). It has been 
suggested, and is plausible, that the deployment 
of CCS will permit wider exploitation of fossil fuel 
resource base (IEA 2013b), and so it is likely to have 
a major impact on the levels of gas produced and 
consumed. Nevertheless, whether CCS will actually 
be commercialised or not is currently far from 
certain (Watson et al. 2012). For the 2DS scenario, 
we therefore run two separate scenarios, one which 
permits the widespread deployment of CCS, and 
the other which assumes that CCS is not available 
in any time period. The suffix _noCCS is added 
when it is assumed that CCS is not available. 
In scenarios that permit CCS, it can first be applied 
to electricity and industrial technologies from 2025. 
Assumptions are purposely optimistic on the rate 
at which it can be deployed: in 2025 in each region 
CCS can be applied to a maximum of 15 per cent of 
total electricity generation while in the industrial 
sector it can capture between 10-20 per cent of 
process emissions and emissions from generating 
process heat (depending on the technology and 
specific sector). After 2025 all CCS technologies 
can grow at a maximum rate of between 10-15 
per cent per annum. Some maximum levels of 
CCS penetration are, however, applied in certain 
sectors. For example, a maximum of 54 per cent 
of emissions can be captured from process heat 
technologies in the iron and steel industries in 
each region. CCS is assumed to have a 90 per cent 
capture rate.
3.3.1  Characterising natural gas as a 
transition fuel
Before looking at results, it is worth exploring 
here what is actually meant by the phrase a gas 
‘bridge’ or natural gas ‘acting as a transition fuel’ 
as introduced in Section 1 because at present 
there is no clear or generally accepted definition. 
For example, Stephenson et al. (2012) criticised the 
‘greenwashing’ of natural gas as a ‘bridging fuel’, 
yet the authors did not actually explicitly state 
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what they meant by this (other than noting that 
natural gas had been characterised as a ‘transition 
fuel for a low carbon energy system’). Similarly, a 
report by the IEA (2011) was interpreted by some 
analysts as heralding a ‘golden age of gas’ with gas 
acting as a ‘bridge towards renewables’ 
(Aguilera & Aguilera 2012). However, as mentioned 
above, the IEA explicitly stated that this ‘golden 
age of gas’ scenario would lead to a 3.6oC average 
surface temperature rise, and that it had not 
attempted to examine the role of natural gas in a 
scenario leading to a 2oC rise. 
MIT discussed gas’s role in the United States 
and concluded that ‘natural gas provides a 
cost-effective bridge to … a low-carbon future’ 
(Moniz et al. 2010). This conclusion was based 
on modelling results indicating an absolute rise 
in total gas consumption from 2010 out to 2040 
(before dropping slightly in 2050) in a scenario 
that resulted in US CO2 emissions falling by 50 per 
cent by 2050 from their levels in 2005.5 The IPCC 
WGIII (2014) also recently stated that: ‘natural gas 
power generation without CCS acts as a bridge 
technology’. This was based on the deployment of 
this technology rising in an absolute sense from 
current levels before peaking and subsequently 
declining to below current levels by 2050.
Levi (2013) uses an alternative definition, based on 
the relative differences in consumption between an 
emissions mitigation scenario (where ‘mitigation’ 
here means a reduction in emissions below 
some unconstrained level) and a non-mitigation 
scenario. The author defined the bridge to be the 
time when global consumption of natural gas, in 
a scenario without carbon capture and storage 
that stabilised CO2 concentrations at 450 ppm (the 
approximate concentration commensurate with 
a 2oC temperature rise), rose ‘substantially’ above 
consumption in a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario.
There are evidently here two alternative 
interpretations of what is meant by gas acting 
as a bridging or transition fuel in a scenario of 
emissions mitigation that leads to a low-carbon 
energy system. The first is an absolute increase 
in consumption from current levels followed by a 
peak and subsequent decline.
5 It is worth noting that a 50 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions in the United States from 2005 
to 2050 is likely an insufficient reduction if the world is to have a reasonable chance of limiting 
the global temperature rise to 2oC. IIASA (2012), for example, suggests that US GHG emissions 
must fall by at least 70 per cent in over the same time frame. 
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The second is a relative increase in consumption, 
over some period, in a GHG mitigation scenario 
compared with consumption in a non-mitigation 
scenario. There is also disagreement over the level 
of emissions reduction in the GHG mitigation 
scenario that should be specified for this to qualify 
as a ‘low-carbon scenario’.
However, since the 2oC limit was explicitly included 
in the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 (UNFCCC 
2009) and is still included in the text adopted by 
the UNFCCC in Durban (UNFCCC 2012), we use a 
scenario with emissions commensurate with a 2oC 
temperature rise as our principal GHG mitigation 
scenario. 
In this report we will therefore make reference 
to gas acting as a transition or bridging fuel in 
scenarios that satisfy this 2oC temperature rise 
limit in both a relative and absolute sense. It is 
worth clarifying precisely what is meant by these 
roles, and the scenarios with which these roles 
are being compared, since this is something that 
otherwise can lead to some confusion (Strachan 
2011).
Natural gas acts a ‘relative’ bridge in a region (or 
globally) when total consumption is greater in 
some period in a scenario leading to a 2oC average 
temperature rise than in a scenario that contains 
no GHG emissions reduction policies.
Natural gas acts as an ‘absolute’ bridge in a region 
(or globally) when total consumption rises above 
current levels over some period until it reaches 
a peak and subsequently enters a permanent or 
terminal decline.  
4
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4.1  REF_GLOBALGP 6
The first scenario presented here is REF_GLOBALGP. 
As discussed above, this is designed to result in a 
long-term temperature rise of 5oC (in 2200) and a 
global gas price market. It is important to highlight 
again that this is not a continuation of the existing 
situation in gas markets, which are characterised 
by very different prices in different regions globally 
with these prices often based on oil indexation. 
However, as discussed above the formation of a 
global gas price, with price formation based on gas 
supply-demand fundamentals, is a more natural 
assumption within a global optimisation model 
such as TIAM-UCL. REF_GLOBALGP therefore 
helps to provide context to the subsequent gas 
production and consumption projections. It is thus 
also useful to explore some of the wider dynamics 
of the energy system in this scenario. The 
differences between this scenario and one which 
continues the existing situation in gas markets is 
discussed below in Section 4.2.
Figure 8 displays global primary energy 
consumption and the global electricity supply 
in REF_GLOBALGP. Primary energy consumption 
increases steadily over the model horizon such 
that it has risen by 30 per cent from 2010 levels 
by 2030 and 70 per cent by 2050. Most sources of 
energy increase over the model horizon, but fossil 
fuels clearly grow by the largest absolute amount: 
coal and gas consumption both grow by over 100 
EJ/annum, with coal rising by 75 per cent from 
2010 levels and gas more than doubling.
The rise in oil consumption is slightly more 
moderate (35 per cent by 2050), but it still remains 
the single largest energy source consumption. 
There is some uptake of renewable sources, 
particularly solar after 2030, but this growth is 
much more modest than for the fossil fuels.
Despite a slight flattening in the 2040’s, it is evident 
that coal continues its dominance of the electricity 
sector globally. From 2020 to 2040, coal accounts 
for close to 50 per cent total electricity generation, 
while gas accounts for an average of around 20 per 
cent total generation over the same period. Since it 
is assumed in this scenario that CO2 emissions are 
not important, a number of regions (particularly 
Europe) that are currently tending to move away 
from coal-based electricity generation reverse this 
trend and construct a large number of new coal 
power plants. It is also important to recognise 
that concerns over local pollution and air quality 
are ignored in this scenario, which may in reality 
curtail the growth in coal consumption to some 
extent. Total installed capacity of coal generation 
thus grows by 50 per cent from 2010 levels by 2030. 
These results have important implications when 
discussing the differences between the low-carbon 
scenarios in subsequent sections.  Hydroelectricity 
remains that largest renewable source of electricity 
until 2040 when it is overtaken by solar PV, which 
grows to 20 per cent of total generation in 2050. 
Finally, following a slight reduction from current 
levels until 2035, nuclear eventually grows to 
around 10 per cent of total generation in 2050, with 
a global installed capacity of 630 GW.
6 The assumptions contained within the scenarios presented in this section are tabulated in the Appendix.
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Figure 8. Primary energy production (left) and electricity production (right) in REF_GLOBALGP 
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Figure 9 displays the consequent growth in GHG 
emissions globally. From around 45 Gt CO2-eq 
in 2010, GHG emissions rise at an average of 
1 per cent/year to over 65 Gt CO2-eq in 2050. 
China accounts for over 20 per cent of this rise, 
but annual emissions in India, Africa and the 
Middle East all grow by around 2.5 Gt CO2-eq. 
Nevertheless, per capita emissions remain far 
higher in developed regions, with levels in Canada 
(given the extent of unconventional oil production) 
by far the highest (30 tCO2/capita in 2050).
Figure 10 shows gas production by type and region. 
Total gas production doubles by 2050, with the 
unconventional sources of gas (shale gas, tight 
gas and coal bed methane) accounting for most of 
this growth. Of these, shale gas rises to the largest 
degree, and annual production exceeds 1 trillion 
cubic metres (Tcm) from 2040 onwards. Similar 
to the present situation, there remains a diverse 
mix in production geographically and no single 
region accounts for more than 25 per cent global 
production in any period. China has the largest 
growth in relative terms (more than tripling by 
2050), but the Middle East grows most in absolute 
terms (by over 0.8 Tcm annually). Production by 
2050 falls from current levels in only two regions: 
in the USA and in the UK. 
Production falls in the USA mainly because of a 
large drop in shale gas production. This is shown in 
Figure 11, which presents the regional breakdown 
of shale gas production globally. Shale gas in the 
USA continues to grow out to 2030 (peaking at just 
over 425 Bcm/year) but after this, production falls 
quite rapidly, to almost negligible levels by 2040. 
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Figure 9. Breakdown of regional GHG 
emissions in REF_GLOBALGP
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Figure 10. Gas production by category and region in REF_GLOBALGP
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7 The sweet spot within each shale play is that which has been identified by drilling as having the most 
productive (in terms of rates and costs of production) qualities – see e.g. McGlade et al. (2013a)
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We showed previously in Figure 4 how we model 
the availability and production costs of shale gas 
in each region. By 2040 the USA has exhausted 
all of the cheapest cost resource available. This 
can be interpreted as having effectively produced 
all of the resource within each shale play’s ‘sweet 
spots’7. Therefore, while a significant proportion of 
resource remains in each shale play, the production 
costs (shown in Figure 11) are too high so that it is 
more cost effective to import gas from Canada and 
pursue other sources of domestic production. In 
2050, the economics of non-sweet spot production 
are more favourable and so it can be seen in Figure 
11 that there is the beginning of a re-emergence of 
US shale gas production. 
In the UK, while there is some level of shale gas 
and coal-bed methane production (discussed in 
detail in Section 6.3), but this is insufficient to 
offset the decline in its conventional production 
and so overall production declines.
The other major sources of shale gas production 
are Central and South America (CSA), which 
exceeds 300 Bcm by 2050, and Canada, which, as 
mentioned, exports a large part of its over 200 Bcm 
production to the United States in later periods. 
In contrast, with high cost relative to other energy 
sources (particularly domestic and imported coal 
and imported natural gas), there is no production 
of shale gas in China. Nevertheless, it can be see 
that generally there is quite a wide geographical 
distribution of shale gas resource exploitation. 
Figure 12 indicates the sectors in which this gas is 
consumed globally. There is growth in all sectors 
other than electricity, which falls slightly over the 
model horizon (although electricity production 
from gas initially grows as there is uptake of 
numerous efficiency improvements in gas 
generation). The industry sector maintains a total 
share of just under 40 per cent and so continues 
to dominate consumption. There is, however, a 
much larger level of growth in gas as a transport 
fuel. Gas is used both as a marine fuel (using 
liquefied natural gas), and for road transportation, 
principally medium- goods vehicles (using 
compressed natural gas). 
Figure 13 provides details of inter-regional gas 
trade. Despite some slight growth in LNG in near-
term periods, generally traded volumes remain 
around current levels. Consequently, as shown 
in Figure 14, LNG’s share of total gas transported 
between regions falls until around 2030 from its 
current level of just under 50 per cent to below 
30 per cent. In later periods, Australia takes a 
larger and larger share of the LNG market as 
other regions move towards pipeline transport. 
There is also a major shift in traded volumes from 
the Other Developing Asia (ODA) region. Despite 
growing its domestic production, the growth in 
domestic consumption means that from an initial 
export level of 65 Bcm/year in 2010, exports fall 
steadily so that it becomes a net LNG importer by 
2035 and is importing nearly 100 Bcm/year by 2050.
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Figure 11. Shale gas production separated by 
region in REF_GLOBALGP
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Figure 12. Gas consumption by sector in 
REF_GLOBALGP
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There is also a reduction in LNG exports from 
African countries, with all of their exports to 
Europe displaced by pipeline trade (both from 
Africa and FSU). Overall, the FSU continues to 
dominate pipeline trade, which grows exports 
to Europe, but more significantly also increases 
its exports to China (to 140 Bcm/year by 2050). 
Exports by pipeline also rise from the Middle East, 
principally to India but also in later periods to ODA.
The right-hand side of Figure 14 shows internally-
generated gas prices from representative regions 
in each of the three main basins identified in 
Section 3.1, with the price differences from the 
single global gas price in the model reflecting the 
difference in transport costs from producer to 
consumer regions. Other regions in each of the 
basins display slightly different price dynamics, 
however since each region within a basin is closely 
linked by a number of trade processes, differences 
are more marginal than those between basins.
It can be seen that the price differentials in TIAM-
UCL are not nearly as wide as the differentials 
seen currently. There are numerous factors 
that influence actual market prices that are not 
(and cannot be) included within TIAM-UCL. For 
example, the LNG industry is prone to major 
supply-demand cycles, such as the shortage of 
LNG ships that led to a more-than doubling of the 
price of chartering an LNG ship in 2011, which can 
have a significant effect on prices in a given year.  
Nevertheless, the prices in TIAM-UCL do maintain 
the current pattern of lowest prices in the United 
States followed by Europe and with prices highest 
in Japan. They also exhibit a steady increase over 
the model horizon.
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Figure 13. Gas traded by pipeline (left) & LNG (right) in REF_GLOBALGP - positive figures 
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Figure 14. Net gas traded (left) & regional gas prices from trading hubs (right) in REF_GLOBALGP
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4.2  Effects of a globalised gas price
This section primarily discusses the differences 
between the scenario that assumes a continuation 
of the current situation in gas markets (REF_
REGIONALGP) and the scenario described above 
that assumes a move towards a global gas price. 
Figure 15 first presents the gas prices in REF_
REGIONALGP in the three different regional basins.  
There is a continuation of large cost differentials 
between the regions, and the price in Japan grows 
to over $15/GJ – a near doubling over the model 
horizon. Again these prices generated do not 
match the actual prices in 2010, nevertheless, as 
above, the ordering of prices generated in TIAM-
UCL is correct in 2010, with the United States 
cheapest and Japan most expensive. The relative 
cost differential between the USA and Europe is 
also approximately correct. It is also noticeable 
that the regional differences in price between REF_
REGIONALGP and REF_GLOBALGP are not as large 
as the imposed cost mark-ups that were shown in 
Table 3.1 ($3/GJ to Europe and $5/GJ to Japan).
This occurs both because there is a higher level 
of gas consumption in all regions in the European 
and Asian basins when there is a move towards 
a (lower) global gas price in REF_GLOBALGP, and 
because they also produce less gas domestically. 
This is shown in Figure 16 with positive figures 
meaning that consumption or production is greater 
in REF_GLOBALGP. For example in the 2020s, 
production in China is around 100 Bcm lower and 
it consumes around 80 Bcm more gas in REF_
GLOBALGP than in REF_REGIONALGP. Similarly, 
throughout the 2030’s production in Europe is 
around 100 Bcm lower in REF_GLOBALGP while 
consumption is over 50 Bcm greater.
Conversely, the exporting regions produce 
considerably more gas in REF_GLOBALGP and 
noticeably reduce domestic consumption. For 
example, production by the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) region in the 2030’s is around 250 Bcm 
greater in REF_GLOBALGP, while consumption is an 
average of 150 Bcm, or around 15 per cent, lower. It 
is worth noting, however, that consumption in FSU 
in both scenarios grows in absolute terms from 
current levels (by 35 per cent in REF_GLOBALGP 
and over 70 per cent in REF_REGIONALGP in 2050); 
in reality this may be mitigated by the considerable 
efficiency savings that are thought to be available, 
but the model does not take these into account.
Despite these changes at the regional level, there 
is not a major difference on aggregate global 
production or consumption levels. The net change 
shown in Figure 16 remains less than 250 Bcm 
globally in all periods, less than 4 per cent total 
consumption in REF_GLOBALGP. As a result, the 
main change between a move towards a global gas 
price and a continuation of regional gas pricing 
scenario is the level of gas that is traded. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 17, which displays the 
percentage of domestic production that is exported 
(by both by pipeline and LNG) from the three major 
exporter regions (Australia, the Former Soviet 
Union, and the Middle East). 
In REF_REGIONALGP, the level of exports from all 
three regions falls dramatically. Exports from FSU 
in particular fall to negligible levels by 2040, but 
exports from MEA and AUS also fall from current 
levels to 10 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. 
These changes reflect the higher prices, and 
therefore the reduced consumption and increased 
production in the importing regions.
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In stark contrast, in REF_GLOBALGP Australia 
consistently exports around 60 per cent of its 
production to other regions over the model 
horizon, up from around 50 per cent currently), 
while FSU and MEA export between around 30-35 
per cent (although the absolute level of exports is 
of course higher in these two regions). 
These results therefore suggest that a move 
towards a global gas price based on supply-
demand dynamics, and a move away from oil 
price indexation, is the strategy that gas-exporting 
regions should follow if they want to increase, 
or even maintain, their current levels of exports.
Further dynamics in changes to volumes of 
gas traded, looking at the relative importance 
of market structure and GHG mitigation, and 
distinguishing between LNG and pipeline trade, are 
discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.
4.3  Summary of results
This section aimed to explore many of the gas 
market dynamics in TIAM-UCL in a scenario that 
disregards any need to cut GHG emissions. There is 
large uptake in the production and consumption of 
all fossil fuels, with coal in particular dominating 
the electricity system. It is unconventional sources 
of gas production that account for much of the rise 
in natural gas production; with shale gas exceeding 
1 Tcm after 2040. There is a wide geographical 
distribution of shale gas production, although 
production from the United States peaks in 2030 
at just over 425 Bcm/year before subsequently 
declining. Gas consumption grows in all sectors 
apart from the electricity sector, and was found to 
be cost effective for both marine transport (as LNG) 
and in medium-goods vehicles (as compressed 
natural gas (CNG)). 
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Figure 16. Differences in gas production (left) and consumption (right) between REF_GLOBALGP 
and REF_REGIONALGP BALGP
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Figure 17. The percentage of domestic gas production exported by Australia, the Former Soviet 
Union and Middle East in REF_REGIONALGP (left) and REF_GLOBALGP (right)
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We also modelled two different scenarios for future 
gas markets. One continued current regionalised 
gas markets, which are characterised by very 
different prices in different regions with these 
prices often based on oil indexation, while the 
other allowed a global gas price to form based on 
gas supply-demand fundamentals. We found only 
a small change in overall global gas production 
levels between these but a major difference 
in levels of gas trade. We concluded that if gas 
exporters choose to defend oil indexation in the 
short-term, they may end up destroying export 
markets in longer term: a move towards pricing 
gas internationally, based on supply-demand 
dynamics, was thus shown to be critical if they are 
to maintain their current levels of exports. 
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We saw in the previous section that gas production 
doubles by 2050 when there is no constraint on 
GHG emissions. There was also a major increase in 
the level of coal production. It is therefore possible 
that, when a GHG emission constraint is applied, 
providing an incentive to move away from carbon-
intensive coal in the electricity and other sectors, 
there may be an even greater uptake of gas. On 
the other hand, given that GHG emissions also 
inevitably result from the consumption of gas, a 
strong move towards mitigating GHG emissions 
could force gas out of the system. This section 
investigates the effect on gas consumption of 
different emission mitigation policies, focusing on 
those policies that lead to the largest uptake of 
gas in the future8. As discussed in Section 3.2, one 
of the simplest ways of exploring these dynamics 
is by introducing a wide range of CO2 taxes and 
examining how this affects consumption levels.
5.1  Global level
To investigate the changes in gas consumption 
globally under different imposed CO2 taxes, it is 
useful to understand the more general changes 
that occur in both the energy and electricity 
systems as the tax increases. This can be seen in 
Figure 18, which includes the results from all of the 
CO2 taxes ranging between $0/tCO2 to $500/tCO2 in 
2050 (and rising at 3.5 per cent before and after). 
All of these scenarios permit the use of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS), and as mentioned in 
Section 2.1 all prices are in 2005 US$.
For each figure, we take the consumption levels 
from all primary energy sources in a single given 
year for the first CO2 tax run ($0/tCO2) and plot 
these along the y-axis. We then move along the 
x-axis to the next run (the 2050 $20/tCO2 run) and 
again plot primary energy consumption of each 
source. This is then repeated for all other runs. An 
identical process is carried out for the electricity 
sector. Figure 18 thus gives total primary energy 
consumption and total electricity generation 
globally in 2020, 2030 and 2050 at the different 
CO2 tax levels that exist in each of these years. 
Since the CO2 taxes in each run rise at the global 
discount rate of 3.5 per cent, a 2050 tax can be 
translated into its equivalent value in 2020 and 
2030 - these are the taxes given on the y-axis. For 
example, a $300/tCO2 in 2050 is equivalent to a tax 
of $105/tCO2 in 2020 and $150/tCO2 in 2030. 
As will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section, when CCS is available, the CO2 taxes 
generated endogenously by TIAM-UCL under the 
2oC and 3oC scenarios that were described in Table 
8 rise to $200/tCO2 and $15/tCO2 in 2050; these are 
shown as dotted lines in Figure 18 for reference.
In 2020, gas consumption increases steadily as 
the CO2 tax is increased. In general this occurs at 
the expense of coal, which steadily loses its share 
of total energy consumption at higher and higher 
taxes. At its minimum, which occurs when there 
is no CO2 tax, gas comprises 27 per cent primary 
energy consumption with coal also accounting for 
27 per cent. At the CO2 tax commensurate with 
the 2oC scenario ($70/tCO2 in 2020) gas’s share 
has risen to 33 per cent and coal’s fallen to 15 per 
cent, while at a tax of $170/tCO2 in 2020 gas rises 
to 37 per cent and coal falls to its minimum of 7 
per cent. A similar pattern of gas replacing coal at 
higher CO2 taxes is seen in the electricity sector, 
since gas offers one of the few short-term methods 
of decarbonising the electricity system. 
For primary energy consumption in 2030 and 2050, 
there is a much more rapid reduction in the use of 
coal at relatively lower CO2 taxes. For example, in 
2020 coal consumption falls to 50 per cent of the 
level in the $0/tCO2 run when the CO2 tax in 2020 
is $70/tCO2. This is equivalent to a CO2 tax in 2050 
of $200/tCO2. In contrast in 2050, the CO2 tax must 
only be $20/tCO2 for coal consumption to have 
fallen to 50 per cent of the level in the $0/tCO2 run. 
This is an important result as it can be seen that 
even though only a modest CO2 tax is required in 
the 3oC scenario (discussed in more detail below) 
in later periods this corresponds to a major drop in 
coal consumption.
In 2030 and 2050, gas use does again increase to 
offset some of the reduction in coal use as the CO2 
tax increases, but there is a larger contribution 
from energy demand reduction, and an increase 
in the use of biomass. At CO2 taxes in 2030 above 
$70/tCO2, gas’s contribution to total primary energy 
consumption begins to shrink as nuclear and 
renewables play an increasing large role.
8 The assumptions contained within the scenarios presented in this section are tabulated in the Appendix. 
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Figure 18. Changes to primary energy consumption (left) and total electricity production (right) 
in 2020, 2030 and 2050 under scenarios with CO2 taxes that rise to between $0/tCO2 and $500/
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In 2030 gas continues to be used to produce a 
significant quantity of electricity, the majority 
of which, even at high CO2 taxes, is unabated. 
There are large quantities of electricity produced 
from solar PV, and unabated gas is one of the 
few technologies within TIAM-UCL that can be 
used as back-up generation. Some gas plants are 
nevertheless also run as base load. Above a 2030 
CO2 tax of $80/tCO2, electricity from gas with CCS 
starts to increase, but it never exceeds more than 
40 per cent total electricity generation from gas at 
any imposed CO2 tax.
Gas plays a much more muted role in the 2050 
electricity system. The percentage of total 
generation coming from gas is highest when there 
is a low imposed CO2 tax of $20/tCO2 (when it 
accounts for 16 per cent of total generation). At the 
CO2 tax commensurate with the 2
oC scenario, this 
has fallen to 10 per cent, the majority of which is 
still unabated generation providing flexible support 
to the intermittent renewables (which themselves 
contribute 40 per cent of total generation). 
Figure 19 looks more closely at global gas 
consumption in isolation under a selection of 
the runs with different imposed CO2 taxes. It is 
evident that a higher CO2 tax leads to increased 
consumption in near-term periods (up to around 
2030), but lower consumption over the longer-term. 
The key reason for the increase up to 2030 is that 
at progressively higher CO2 taxes, coal becomes 
less and less cost-effective. As demonstrated by the 
top panels in Figure 18, gas offers one of the few 
short-term options for replacing this coal since it is 
not possible to use any CCS technologies or deploy 
renewable or other low-carbon technologies on as 
large a scale as needed to offset the drop in coal.
Figure 19 demonstrates that an important step 
in understanding the question of what scenarios 
lead to the greatest gas consumption in the future, 
is addressing what is meant by ‘the future’. In 
other words, over what timeframe in the different 
scenarios does gas consumption reach its highest 
levels, and how high are those levels? Figure 20 
therefore rearranges the data from all of the CO2 
tax runs and presents global gas consumption (y 
axis) at different CO2 taxes (x axis) for milestone 
years. The lowest line, for example, is global gas 
consumption in 2020 at different CO2 tax levels. 
In this year, as the CO2 tax increases, total gas 
consumption increases. This demonstrates that in 
the short-term (i.e. out to 2020), the more stringent 
the CO2 tax, or equivalent, the higher the level of 
gas consumption.
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Figure 19. Global gas consumption over time 
under different CO2 tax scenarios
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Figure 20. Global gas consumption at 
different CO2 tax levels for different years
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Figure 21. CO2 taxes that maximise global 
gas consumption and the CO2 taxes in the 
2oC and 3oC scenarios
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 All other milestone years exhibit a peak at some 
level of CO2 tax, as shown. For example in 2050 
it is clear that there is a distinct peak in gas 
consumption at a CO2 tax at $20/tCO2. Figure 20 
shows that a low CO2 tax leads to higher maximum 
levels of gas consumption in later periods, while 
increasing the CO2 tax causes the emissions in 
different periods to converge to a range of 4-5 Tcm/
year, with the 2050 emissions falling fastest and 
furthest as the CO2 tax increases.
An alternative manner in which to observe this is 
given in Figure 21. This figure shows the CO2 tax 
level (on the y axis) that results in the highest level 
of gas consumption in each year (on the x axis) 
alongside the CO2 taxes generated in the 2
oC and 
3oC scenarios. In other words, the ‘maximal global 
gas consumption’ line in Figure 21 plots the CO2 
tax rate of the peak in each of the lines shown in 
Figure 20 against the year in which it occurs.
Again, it can be seen that while a high CO2 tax 
leads to higher gas consumption in near periods, 
in later periods the highest gas consumption 
arises with a lower CO2 tax. From 2030 onwards, 
the CO2 tax that leads to the highest levels 
of gas consumption averages just under $40/
tCO2, although it falls slightly in the final period. 
It is around 2025 that the CO2 tax generated 
endogenously by TIAM-UCL in the 2oC scenario 
is closest to the tax rate that leads to the highest 
level of gas consumption across the scenarios 
with different tax rates. This suggests that if a 
global CO2 tax were to be introduced that was 
commensurate with a 2oC scenario (which rises 
to around $200/tCO2 as shown in Figure 21), this 
would lead, around 2025, to the highest level of 
global gas consumption that would be seen under 
any mitigation scenario, including those that 
reduce CO2 emissions by much less overall.  In 
contrast, it is not until 2050 that the much lower 
CO2 tax that results in the 3
oC scenario leads to 
the highest level of gas consumption across the 
mitigation scenarios.
What about the technology uncertainty that could 
affect the uptake of gas in the future? As discussed 
previously it is anticipated that a failure of CCS to 
commercialise could have important repercussions 
for the usefulness of gas in a carbon-constrained 
world. As will be discussed in the next section, 
the endogenously-calculated CO2 taxes in the 
2oC and 3oC are much higher when CCS is not 
permitted (over two and a half times higher in the 
2oC scenario, at $550/tCO2 and double in the 3
oC 
scenario). 
However, not only is the CO2 tax much higher, 
which as demonstrated in Figure 19 generally 
means that gas consumption is lower in the 
long term, but also even at a given CO2 tax level, 
consumption is generally lower when CCS is not 
available compared with an identical scenario 
when it is available. This is shown in Figure 22, 
which compares gas consumption between a 
number of different tax levels in scenarios that 
do allow CCS and those that do not. A positive 
percentage means that consumption is higher 
when CCS is not available, and a negative 
percentage that it is lower when CCS is not 
available. Up to 2025, the changes that are seen 
are all less than 5 per cent in all scenarios, and in 
the $100/tCO2 case it can be seen that there is still 
little difference even in later years. However, at 
2050 taxes of $300/tCO2 and above, consumption is 
generally lower in scenarios that do not have CCS, 
and from 2030 onwards this reduction becomes 
increasingly more pronounced, especially at higher 
CO2 tax levels.
The $200/tCO2 tax scenario displays different 
behaviour, however. It can be seen that 
consumption is around 5 per cent higher in all 
periods up to 2040 when CCS is not available. 
Nearly all of this increase occurs in the electricity 
and transport sectors. There is obviously no 
biomass with CCS in the no-CCS scenario and it 
is now cost-effective to reduce further coal-based 
generation between 2015 and 2030 and use gas 
instead. From 2030-2040 there is also a greater 
uptake of CNG vehicles, particularly in the Middle 
East.
While the additional coal-to-gas switching 
before 2030 means that electricity emissions are 
slightly lower in the no-CCS case, the absence of 
(emissions-negative) biomass with CCS and the 
displacement of nuclear with gas means that CO2 
emissions from the electricity sector are around 
2Gt/year higher when CCS is not permitted. 
Further, on an energy system-wide level at this CO2 
tax level, GHG emissions are around 10 Gt CO2-eq 
(or 35 per cent) higher in 2050 when CCS is not 
available. 
It is therefore important to remember that 
although a $200/tCO2 tax in 2050 is the tax that 
TIAM-UCL suggests is required in the 2oC scenario 
when CCS is permitted, a $200/tCO2 tax is certainly 
not sufficient if CCS is not available: as noted the 
tax must be $550/tCO2 in 2050 in a 2
oC scenario 
when CCS is not available. 
At the higher CO2 tax levels, i.e. those that provide 
the emissions reductions more commensurate 
with a 2oC temperature rise, when CCS is not 
available gas is itself displaced from the electricity 
sector. The emissions from un-abated generation, 
and the associated cost penalty, mean that gas 
use in the electricity quickly ceases to be cost 
effective; the model instead relies on biomass and 
renewables. 
In summary, Figure 22 suggests that CCS is 
generally very important in leading to a higher 
level of gas consumption in the future. This is 
particularly the case if the agreed temperature 
rises are not to be exceeded. The role of CCS is 
discussed in more detail in Section 6. 
5.2  Regional level
Results have so far focussed on the global level; 
however there are many important underlying 
dynamics within different regions. This is shown 
in Table 9. Following a similar process to Figure 
21, Table 9 provides the CO2 taxes that lead to the 
highest levels of gas consumption within each 
of the regions indicated. Whilst it can be seen 
that some regions, such as the United States and 
Europe, generally follow the global pattern, others, 
such as Canada, exhibit very different behaviour.
In Canada, gas consumption is highest when there 
are never any CO2 taxes imposed. This is because 
in any scenario with a CO2 tax, there is a reduction 
in the demand for Canadian unconventional oil. 
The production of natural bitumen requires a 
large amount of heat. This is generally provided by 
natural gas, and so if there is less demand for this 
type of oil, there will be less demand for gas.  
In contrast in India, it can be seen that the CO2 
taxes that result in the highest levels of gas 
consumption are similar to those that are seen in 
the 2oC scenario. This suggests that maximising 
gas consumption in India is also most beneficial 
from a CO2 emissions reduction perspective 
(because, as will be seen in the next section, the 
gas consumption substitutes in large part for the 
consumption of coal). These dynamics are explored 
in more detail in the following section, but it is 
evident that CO2 taxes can have very different 
effects on different regions, and all do not follow 
the relationship observed globally. 
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Figure 22. Differences in gas consumption 
when CCS is and is not permitted
Table 9. CO2 taxes that lead to the highest 
levels of regional gas consumption in 
different years and the CO2 taxes in the 2
oC 
and 3oC scenarios.
Region
CO2 tax maximising gas 
consumption ($/tCO2)
2020 2030 2040
AFR 7 10 20
AUS 157 20 20
CAN 0 0 0
CHI 107 151 80
CSA 64 0 0
Europe 164 101 40
FSU 100 10 60
IND 57 101 160
JPN and SKO 0 111 60
MEA 107 0 0
MEX 21 0 0
ODA 14 20 20
USA 150 60 20
Global 164 30 20
CO2 tax level in 2
oC 
scenario
70 100 200
CO2 tax level in 2
oC - 
no CCS scenario
165 250 550
9 As noted in Section 2.1, to provide some context to the regional results, the 
proportions of 2011 electricity generation and primary energy supply that are coal, oil, 
gas, nuclear and renewables within each of the regions are outlined in the appendix. 
Note: In this table, Europe comprises 
the previous WEU, EEU and UK regions 
with a single line also given to the 
combination of Japan and South Korea.
40
2050 CO2 tax of $100/tCO2
2050 CO2 tax of $200/tCO2
2050 CO2 tax of $300/tCO2
2050 CO2 tax of $500/tCO2
2050 CO2 tax of $400/tCO2
2050 CO2 tax of $600/tCO2
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5.3  Combining regional gas pricing and 
emissions reduction
So far in this section, we have focussed on the 
way gas consumption varies with GHG mitigation 
policies. As we saw in Section 4.1, a continuation 
of gas pricing that is not based on supply and 
demand fundamentals (our ‘regional gas prices’ 
scenario), only led to a 4 per cent reduction in 
consumption on a global scale. However, it did have 
major impact on regional consumption levels and 
trade flows. 
We can therefore combine uncertainty over future 
CO2 policies with the uncertainty examined in the 
previous section regarding the pricing structure 
for gas and examine their relative impact on 
trade flows. This can be done by comparing LNG 
and pipeline flows under scenarios with different 
temperature targets and with different gas market 
structures.   
These are presented in Figure 23. Dashed lines 
are total exports from scenarios resulting in the 
stated temperature rises with the ‘regional gas 
pricing’ structure and assumptions from Table 7, 
and bold lines the scenarios resulting in the stated 
temperature rises that have a ‘global gas price’. The 
emissions reductions assumptions in both sets of 
scenarios are again identical to those in Table 8.
For both pipeline (top) and LNG (bottom) trade, 
results suggest that trade decreases in scenarios 
with the regional gas prices, regardless of the 
temperature constraint. This contrasts with what 
has actually been observed over the past few 
years, with an increasing amount of trade (inter-
regional pipeline trade increased by 7 per cent 
between 2012 and 2010 and LNG trade by 10 per 
cent) at the same time as the divergent prices 
shown previously in Figure 6 have continued. 
There are a number of reasons why TIAM-UCL has 
not reproduced these results, but it is important 
to remember that the key goal of the model is to 
generate plausible long-term scenarios under the 
assumption of global surplus maximisation. It is 
unsurprising that it does not match results seen 
over the past few years as this is not what it aims 
to do. There are numerous factors, for example 
business cycles or concerns over energy security 
driving non-cost optimal decisions that will have 
been affecting trade dynamics over the short 
term that the model does not or cannot take into 
account. The model is, however, much better suited 
to give insights over the longer-term under the 
different potential scenarios discussed.
Looking first at pipeline trade (top of Figure 23), 
there is a distinct divergence between the two 
different market structures, but quite a close 
bunching for all differing emissions scenarios.
The global gas price (GLOBALGP) scenarios all 
rise to over 800 Bcm/year in 2030, while all of the 
regional-based pricing (REGIONALGP) scenarios 
decline to around 300 Bcm/year. The GLOBALGP 
scenarios then diverge: the 2oC (2DS) and 3oC (3DS) 
scenarios continue to grow to over 1000 Bcm/year 
by 2040, with a noticeable reduction after 2040 in 
2DS. The reference case (REF) rises more slowly 
than these two scenarios, while the 2oC scenario 
without CCS (2DS_noCCS) declines back towards 
400 Bcm.
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Figure 23. Total gas traded by pipeline 
(top) and LNG (bottom) under different 
emissions mitigation and market structure 
assumptions
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With the REGIONALGP scenarios, pipeline trade in 
the reference case (REF_REGIONALGP) and 2DS_
noCCS_REGIONALGP case continue to decline after 
2030, while 2DS and 3DS rise slightly out to 2050. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that there is not nearly 
as large a spread in later periods as is the case with 
the GLOBALGP scenarios. 
This figure indicates that the difference between 
any pair of scenarios with identical emissions 
reductions but different market structures is much 
greater than the difference between scenarios with 
identical market structures but different emissions 
reductions. For example, the difference in traded 
volumes in 2050 between 2DS_GLOBALGP and 
REF_GLOBALGP is 100 Bcm, while between 2DS_
GLOBALGP and 2DS_REGIONALGP it is 560 Bcm.
This suggests that if gas-exporting countries want 
to expand (or maintain) pipeline gas exports, they 
should focus attention on altering their pricing 
policies, i.e. moving towards a global gas price 
and away from oil price indexation. This has a 
far greater impact on their level of gas exports 
than whether or not there is ambitious global 
emissions reduction agreement. However, if the 
market and pricing structure were to change, then 
until 2030, and potentially even longer if CCS is 
commercialised, the adoption of any ambitious 
emissions reduction agreement would result in 
little loss of markets, and could actually lead to a 
much greater level of exports. 
Next looking at LNG volumes (bottom of Figure 
23), again there is a lower level of exports with 
the REGIONALGP based scenarios. However, there 
is much less of a distinct trend for the scenarios 
with the two different market structures than was 
the case for pipeline volumes. For the GLOBALGP 
scenarios, REF and 3DS grow slightly in initial 
periods, but then remain at broadly similar levels 
from 2020 onwards (at an average of about 300 
Bcm and 350 Bcm respectively). In contrast, LNG 
exports grow in the 2oC scenarios, with a very rapid 
growth when CCS is not permitted and a steady 
but more monotonic growth when it is available. 
For the REGIONALGP scenarios, there is again a 
rapid rise in 2DS_noCCS up to 500 Bcm, but this 
is followed by a decline down to around current 
levels, while REF and 3DS decline in nearly all 
periods. 
It is therefore evident that the 2oC scenarios (both 
with and without CCS) have a larger level of LNG 
trade than REF and 3DS, regardless of the assumed 
market structure. Indeed exports are also nearly 
always larger when CCS is not available, while 
there is little difference between REF and 3DS.
Comparing these LNG results from all of the 
scenarios, there appears to be a very similar level 
of difference between pairs of scenarios with 
identical market structures but different emissions 
reductions and between pairs of scenarios with 
identical emissions reductions but different market 
structures. For example, the difference in LNG 
trade volumes in 2050 between 2DS_GLOBALGP 
and REF_GLOBALGP is 280 Bcm, while between 
2DS_GLOBALGP and 2DS_REGIONALGP it is 285 
Bcm. This is therefore a different situation than 
that seen for pipeline trade. These results therefore 
place equal importance on assumptions over 
emissions reduction and market structures for 
projecting future LNG trade.
However, a much clearer conclusion is that 
regardless of any changes to market structure, 
if countries want to expand their LNG exports, 
they should actively pursue an ambitious global 
agreement on GHG emissions mitigation. This 
arises mainly because of the significant role gas 
plays in replacing future coal demand in the 
emerging economies in Asia (particularly China), a 
market that is largely supplied by LNG.
5.4  Summary of results
This section examined the question: ‘What policies 
lead to the highest level of gas consumption?’ We 
primarily investigated the effect of GHG mitigation 
polices on overall levels of gas consumption. In 
near-term periods, the higher the CO2 tax, the 
greater the level of gas consumption globally; 
however, by 2050, a CO2 tax more commensurate 
with a 3oC temperature rise leads to the highest 
level of gas consumption observed in that year in 
any scenario. This global pattern was not observed 
in all regions, however, and indeed some specific 
regions display very different behaviour. It was 
further found that CCS has an important effect of 
increasing gas consumption, even at low imposed 
CO2 tax levels.
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It was established previously that when a global 
gas price forms, regions in the European and 
Asian basins consume more gas but produce less 
domestically, while conversely exporting regions 
produce considerably more gas but noticeably 
reduce domestic consumption. As a result, there is 
only a slight increase in consumption globally, but 
more importantly that the assumed gas market 
structure can have a major effect on trade routes 
and flows. In this section, we further found that 
gas pipeline trade in the future is increased more 
through the establishment of a global gas price 
based on supply-demand fundamentals than by 
any specific level of future emissions reduction. In 
contrast for LNG trade, assumptions on emissions 
reduction and market and pricing structures are of 
equal importance for future projections.
We also demonstrated that scenarios that lead 
to a 2oC temperature rise have larger export 
volumes, both by pipeline and LNG, than those 
scenarios that lead to a higher temperature 
increases. For pipeline trade, the adoption of any 
ambitious emissions reduction agreement results 
in little loss of markets and could (if carbon 
capture and storage is available) actually lead to 
a much greater level of exports. For LNG trade, we 
concluded that export countries should actively 
pursue an ambitious global agreement on GHG 
emissions mitigation if they want to expand their 
exports. These results therefore have important 
implications for the negotiating positions of gas-
exporting countries in the ongoing discussions 
on agreeing an ambitious global agreement on 
emissions reduction.
6
The Role of Gas in a Low-
Carbon Energy System
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This final results section now focuses discussion 
on the role of gas in a 2oC future, particularly its 
role as a ‘bridge’ or ‘transition’ fuel10. As mentioned 
previously, a ‘relative’ bridge is taken to be the 
period over which consumption is higher in a 
2oC scenario than in a case with no emissions 
reduction policies (our reference case). An 
‘absolute’ bridge is taken more simply to be the 
time when global or regional consumption rises 
from current levels in a 2oC scenario. 
6.1  Global level
Gas consumption in the reference case (REF) was 
shown previously in Figure 10, but to show more 
clearly the changes in consumption within each 
region this is given numerically in Table 10. We 
have highlighted the year in which consumption in 
any region reaches a peak and subsequently enters 
a terminal decline.
Figure 24 next presents overall consumption on a 
global level in REF, and the 2oC (2DS) and 3oC (3DS) 
scenarios, which rely on the emissions reduction 
assumptions set out previously in Table 8. Figure 
24 also provides the percentage changes between 
these scenarios. 
Similar to REF, gas consumption in 3DS grows 
steadily over the model horizon. However, 
consumption is on average around 300 Bcm or 7 
per cent greater in all years in 3DS relative to REF, 
although with a slightly larger difference in earlier 
periods.
In contrast in 2DS total consumption peaks in 2035 
at just over 5 Tcm before subsequently declining. 
The maximum difference in consumption between 
2DS and REF is just over 500 Bcm (between 2020 
and 2025), or nearly 15 per cent greater than 
consumption levels in REF. With consumption 
continuing to climb in REF, this difference reduces 
over time so that by 2040 consumption is lower in 
2DS. In the final period, there is a more noticeable 
drop, and consumption in 2DS finishes 20 per cent 
below that in REF.
The sectoral breakdown of consumption in 2DS 
is given in Figure 25. Figure 25 also displays 
the differences in consumption in each sector 
compared with REF (shown previously in Figure 
12). As discussed in Section 4.1, consumption in 
REF was seen to grow in all sectors other than the 
electricity sector. In 2DS (the LHS of Figure 25) 
consumption in the electricity sector grows out 
to 2025 before declining (although still remaining 
above the consumption levels in REF), while 
the commercial and residential sectors decline 
from 2030 onwards. The declines in these three 
sectors as well as the plateauing of growth in 
the industrial sector account for the peak and 
subsequent decline in total consumption in 2DS. 
Consumption in 2DS is greater than REF in the 
electricity and industrial sectors in all years, 
however the commercial, transport and upstream 
sectors all require less gas in all periods. The 
residential sector is initially higher in early periods 
before falling in both relative and absolute terms 
in later periods. 
10 The assumptions contained within the scenarios presented in this section are tabulated in the Appendix.
Table 10. Gas consumption by region in a scenario in REF (in Bcm/year)
Region 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
AFR 86 139 230 286 331 378 424 512 586
AUS 24 21 28 34 44 50 52 54 55
CAN 92 98 115 132 148 174 225 253 291
CHI 103 201 253 304 367 432 476 531 561
CSA 130 150 183 220 277 327 400 464 516
Europe 525 502 517 531 552 517 512 519 548
FSU 491 516 573 609 592 632 643 665 658
IND 58 104 175 202 230 259 270 264 283
JPN and SKO 135 146 157 151 151 140 127 115 102
MEA 297 374 423 529 600 668 732 785 811
MEX 56 54 53 57 68 93 128 164 172
ODA 150 202 233 281 342 409 486 541 612
USA 684 703 737 790 809 817 752 673 529
Global 2832 3211 3676 4126 4509 4897 5228 5541 5722
Highlighted cells in the table represent peak consumption.
The behaviour seen in Figure 24 and 25 shows 
a key result: on a global level, gas can play an 
important role as a bridging fuel both in relative 
and absolute terms up to 2035. However, there are 
a number of important caveats to this, upon which 
this result is very dependent. Global consumption 
of coal must be significantly reduced both from 
current levels and relative to the levels seen in REF 
in all time periods in a 2oC scenario. This can be 
seen in Figure 26, which presents primary energy 
consumption over time in 2DS, and the changes 
relative to the REF (shown previously in Figure 8). 
The line in the lower panel of Figure 26 shows the 
percentage increase in gas consumption relative 
to the drop in coal consumption (both in terms of 
EJ). A figure of 100 per cent means that the drop in 
coal consumption is entirely met by an equivalent 
increase in gas consumption, while 0 per cent 
means that gas does not contribute at all. It is 
immediately evident that in both absolute and 
relative terms coal consumption falls to a much 
greater extent than gas increases. 
Gas offsets three quarters of the drop in coal 
consumption in 2015. It is clear, however, that at 
this time the reduction in coal consumption is 
quite small compared with the major drop seen 
in subsequent periods. The offsetting role of gas 
falls rapidly: even though gas consumption is 
nearly 15 per cent greater in 2DS than in REF in 
2020 and 2025 (as shown in Figure 24) this only 
respectively offsets 30 per cent and 20 per cent of 
the much greater reduction in coal consumption. 
Subsequently, as the increase in gas consumption 
in 2DS relative to REF begins to fall, gas’s 
contribution decreases even lower.
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
A
n
n
u
al
 g
as
 c
on
su
m
p
ti
on
 
(T
cm
/y
ea
r)
Figure 24. Global gas consumption (top) and 
changes relative to REF (bottom)
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Figure 25. Global gas consumption in 2DS by sector and differences with REF
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Eventually after 2035, when both gas and coal 
consumption are lower than in REF, gas obviously 
does not offset anything.
Shortly after 2020 nuclear, renewable electricity 
technologies, and biomass play a bigger role than 
gas in offsetting the drop in coal production. This 
role grows increasingly more important over time. 
These results therefore suggest that gas can only 
play a role in displacing coal up to 2020. Thereafter, 
while gas does continue to play some part in 
helping to fill the gap left by the huge reduction 
in coal consumption up to 2035, this is much less 
significant than the increases in zero or negative-
carbon technologies.
Perhaps the clearest way of visualising the 
relative bridging role of gas is shown in Figure 
27, which isolates the percentage changes in coal 
consumption and the percentage changes in gas 
consumption between REF and 2DS over time.  
Coal consumption in 2020 in 2DS is 40 per cent 
lower than in REF, while, as mentioned above, gas 
is nearly 15 per cent greater. From 2025 onwards 
gas’s relative increase falls while the reduction in 
coal consumption (again relative to REF) continues 
to grow to over 85 per cent. It is therefore again 
evident that coal production must be severely 
curtailed in all periods, and so the increase in gas 
consumption between 2015 and 2035 is in no way 
additional to increases in coal production. This 
brings out two very important elements of a ‘gas 
transition’ in a low-carbon scenario.
First, the bridging period is strictly time-limited. 
Gas consumption peaks and soon falls below the 
level in the non-mitigation scenario after 2035 and 
so to classify gas as a transition fuel, there must 
be a clear strategy how gas consumption can be at 
curtailed from this date.
Second, and even more important, the increased 
use of gas needs to be accompanied by an even 
larger decrease in coal consumption if the global 
temperature target is to be achieved. Again, any 
advocacy of gas as a transition fuel needs therefore 
to have a convincing narrative as to how global 
coal consumption can be curtailed. Otherwise it is 
likely that the emissions from the increased use 
of gas will be additional to those from coal, rather 
than being offset by an even greater reduction in 
coal use.
A third key factor in the bridging role that gas can 
play is the role of CCS. Figure 28 is similar to Figure 
24, but this time includes the 2oC scenario in which 
CCS is not available (2DS_noCCS). In 2020 there is 
a slight difference between the two 2oC scenarios, 
with consumption actually slightly higher when 
CCS is not permitted. At its maximum, gas 
consumption is therefore almost 20 per cent 
greater than REF. 
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Figure 26. Primary energy consumption in 
2DS, and changes relative to REF (shown 
previously in Figure 8)
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Figure 27. Percentage changes in coal and 
gas consumption in 2DS relative to REF
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However, absolute consumption in 2DS_noCCS 
peaks in 2025 at just over 4.5 Tcm, and then 
subsequently declines at an average of 2.3 per 
cent/year. Therefore by 2030, gas consumption 
falls below REF and thereafter consumption is 
significantly lower in all time periods. Indeed by 
2050 it is over 50 per cent lower. The absence of 
CCS thus shortens the natural gas bridge in both 
absolute and relative terms by ten years, and also 
results in the subsequent need for a very rapid 
decline in consumption following this bridge. The 
commercialisation of CCS is therefore crucial for 
the future role of natural gas in a decarbonised 
energy system. 
A fourth factor to bear in mind is that the 
definition of the ‘relative’ bridge given in Section 
3.3.1 referred to the difference between a 2oC 
scenario and a scenario with no GHG emission 
reduction policies.  It is not necessarily the 
case, however, that this is the most appropriate 
comparative scenario. For example, given the 
commitments pledged as part of the Copenhagen 
Accord (UNFCCC 2009), it is unlikely that we 
are currently proceeding along a ‘no policies’ 
or ‘reference’ emissions pathway. Similarly a 
number of air quality and fuel efficiency standards 
have been introduced internationally (see e.g. 
European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union (2008)), which may not have the explicit 
intention of mitigating GHG emissions, but are 
still likely to result in some emissions reduction, 
and importantly coal consumption. It could 
therefore be argued that alterative scenarios such 
as the IEA’s ‘Current Policies’ or ‘New Policies’ 
scenarios provide a more appropriate comparison       
(IEA 2013c).
We chose to use a ‘no policies’ scenario to be most 
explicit about the relevant assumptions. However, 
as was discussed in Section 4, coal production is 
extremely prevalent in this scenario, and indeed 
some regions that are currently trending away 
from coal-based electricity generation construct 
a number of new coal power plants. This could be 
considered unrealistic. If so, it may be the case that 
the 3oC scenario is a better scenario with which to 
compare gas consumption in the 2oC scenario. As 
noted in Section 5.1, 3DS results in a significantly 
lower level of coal consumption than in REF.
Consumption in 3DS was shown in Figure 24. 
While gas still acts as a ‘relative’ bridge in 2DS 
when compared to 3DS, this is to a much lesser 
degree. The maximum difference between these 
two scenarios is lower (4 per cent in 2025), and 
indeed after 2030 consumption in 2DS is lower 
than in 3DS. Further, there is no increase in gas 
consumption above 3DS until 2020. The ‘relative’ 
bridge formed by natural gas is thus shortened 
to 10 years (between 2020 and 2030) and the 
advantage (from a climate perspective) conveyed 
by consuming additional gas is significantly 
diminished.
6.2  Regional level
The final caveat in understanding the potential for 
gas to act as a transition fuel is that global level 
results do not necessarily describe particularly 
well the underlying variation between different 
regions. Figure 29 shows results at a region level: 
first absolute consumption split in 2DS, and then 
the relative changes in consumption between REF 
and 2DS. It is immediately apparent that gas has a 
very different role to play in different regions. For 
example, gas consumption in China is greater in all 
periods in 2DS and is nearly 50 per cent greater in 
2040 (at around 700 Bcm).
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Figure 28. Primary energy consumption in 
2DS, and changes relative to REF (shown 
previously in Figure 8)
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On the other hand, gas consumption in Central 
and South America (CSA), the Middle East (MEA), 
and Mexico (MEX) is lower in all periods in 2DS. 
Consumption is reduced in all three of these in 
a number of sectors (electricity, upstream, and 
residential), but interestingly the largest change 
occurs in the transport sector, with hydrogen being 
preferred over CNG in medium goods vehicles.
Table 11 accompanies Figure 29, and provides 
actual consumption figures, while also highlighting 
the year in which consumption peaks and 
subsequently declines terminally within any region 
(if this occurs). The peak in consumption in the 
USA moves forward by 10 years (from 2035 in REF), 
and peaks appear in a number of regions that did 
not exhibit one previously. 
As with the global-level results, the failure of CCS 
to become available also has a significant effect on 
regional consumption levels. This is demonstrated 
in Figure 30, which, similar to Figure 29, presents 
absolute production split by region in 2DS_noCCS, 
and the changes compared to REF. In 2020, a 
number of regions (particularly Australia and 
China) increase consumption by an even greater 
than when CCS was available. However, by 2040 
only China has gas consumption greater than in 
REF. All other regions have reduced consumption, 
in many cases by quite a substantial degree. 
Table 12 again numerically presents the absolute 
production figures and highlights the peak 
production years within each region if this 
occurs. While consumption still does not peak in 
all regions, in general the peaks occur earlier in 
this scenario than either REF or 2DS (with CCS). 
The peak for the United States, for example, 
moves further forward to 2020, and European gas 
consumption peaks in 2025 rather than 2030 in the 
2oC scenario when CCS was available. 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
G
a
s 
c
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 (
T
c
m
/y
e
a
r)
 
Figure 29. Absolute gas consumption by 
region in 2DS, and changes between 2DS and 
REF
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Note: Europe (EUR) includes UK and Japan and South Korea (JPN & SKO) are combined. 
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Figure 30. Absolute gas consumption by 
region in 2DS_noCCS, and changes between 
this scenario and REF
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Insights can now be drawn on the role of natural 
gas as a transition fuel in the 2oC scenarios in 
each region. These are summarised in Table 14. 
This table indicates the latest year to which gas 
acts as a relative bridge (since in all case the 
bridging period commences in 2010), the latest 
year to which gas acts as an absolute bridge, and 
the percentage by which consumption is greater 
when the difference between consumption in the 
2oC scenario and REF is at its maximum value. 
Table 11. Absolute gas consumption by region in 2oC scenario including dates when regional 
consumption peaks (highlighted cells) (all figures in Bcm/year)11
Region 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
AFR 86 129 246 284 324 342 322 326 337
AUS 24 27 31 35 43 45 45 44 33
CAN 92 98 121 121 129 122 109 95 89
CHI 103 196 319 383 482 636 688 695 609
CSA 130 143 171 218 270 299 305 298 283
Europe 525 547 643 681 723 701 675 623 497
FSU 491 513 567 645 566 567 487 455 418
IND 58 105 170 240 275 305 304 320 320
JPN and SKO 135 163 226 204 211 195 169 143 125
MEA 297 375 402 460 489 517 569 608 648
MEX 56 54 49 53 60 84 113 147 143
ODA 150 202 289 313 364 413 446 472 471
USA 684 814 934 1008 955 823 805 747 570
Global 2832 3365 4169 4645 4891 5049 5037 4972 4543
11 As noted previously, results from this table (as with all others) should not be interpreted as a forecast. 
The results seen here assume that countries will meet their Copenhagen Accord emissions reductions 
and will work (from 2015) towards mitigating the temperature rise to 2oC in the most cost-optimal 
manner. It is, for example, unlikely that gas consumption in Europe will be higher in 2015 than in 2010.
Table 12. Absolute gas consumption by region in the 2oC scenario that does not allow CCS 
including dates when regional consumption peaks (highlighted cells) (all figures in Bcm/year)
Region 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
AFR 86 129 281 296 298 304 275 212 146
AUS 24 27 41 34 35 24 22 22 21
CAN 92 98 113 114 94 80 54 35 15
CHI 103 196 437 651 588 636 633 638 640
CSA 130 143 159 196 204 204 199 119 96
Europe 525 547 675 691 596 543 450 362 249
FSU 491 513 578 541 467 455 404 350 286
IND 58 105 176 225 223 245 256 236 214
JPN and SKO 135 163 210 209 177 137 101 69 31
MEA 297 375 359 423 436 440 464 481 417
MEX 56 54 55 50 54 59 59 51 33
ODA 150 202 300 325 308 327 335 298 272
USA 684 814 978 921 736 607 504 375 222
Global 2832 3365 4361 4677 4218 4060 3758 3248 2643
This maximum relative increase is important as 
provides a proxy for the magnitude of the role 
played by gas; in other words it describes the 
‘height’ of the bridge. Table 14 also separately 
considers the 2oC scenarios with and without CCS.
50
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Table 13. Criteria by which duration & magnitude of natural gas bridge in each region is judged
Criteria Description Score Colour in Table 6.5
Duration of absolute bridge 
Lasts until 2040 or later 2 Green
Lasts until between 2020 and 2040 1 Orange
Lasts only up to and including 2020 0 Red
Duration of relative bridge
Lasts until 2040 or later 2 Green
Lasts until between 2020 and 2040 1 Orange
Lasts only up to and including 2020 0 Red
Maximum relative increase
Greater than 30 per cent 2 Green
Between 10 per cent and 30 per cent 1 Orange
Less than 10 per cent 0 Red
Criteria Score Description of potential role for natural gas
Name in 
Table 6.5
Colour in 
Table 6.5
Strength of bridge
5-6 Extended and strong potential role to act as a transition fuel Strong Green
3-4
More diminished but still maintains 
a good potential to act as a 
transition fuel
Good Orange
<2 Very limited or no potential role to act as a transition fuel Limited Red
Table 14. Years to which natural gas acts as a bridge in 2oC scenarios, both in absolute terms and 
relative to REF, the percentage consumption is above REF at its maximum value, and therefore 
the potential role gas can play as a transition fuel in each region.
With CCS Without CCS
Region
Period over 
which acts 
as a relative 
bridge
Maximum 
difference in 
consumption
Period over 
which acts as 
an absolute 
bridge
Potential role 
to act as a 
transition 
fuel
Period over 
which acts 
as a relative 
bridge
Maximum 
difference in 
consumption
Period over 
which acts as 
an absolute 
bridge
Potential role 
to act as a 
transition 
fuel
AFR 2020 7% 2050 Limited 2025 22% 2035 Good
AUS 2025 24% 2040 Good 2025 50% 2020 Good
CAN 2020 6% 2030 Limited N/A 0% 2025 Limited
CHI 2050 45% 2045 Strong 2050 114% 2050 Strong
CSA N/A 0% 2040 Limited N/A 0% 2030 Limited
Europe 2045 36% 2030 Strong 2035 30% 2025 Good
FSU 2025 6% 2035 Limited N/A 1% 2020 Limited
IND 2050 21% 2050 Strong 2025 11% 2040 Good
JPN and 
SKO
2050 44% 2030 Strong 2030 38% 2020 Good
MEA N/A 0% 2050 Limited N/A 0% 2045 Limited
MEX N/A 0% 2045 Limited N/A 4% 2040 Limited
ODA 2035 24% 2050 Good 2025 29% 2040 Good
USA 2050 28% 2025 Good 2025 33% 2020 Good
Global 2035 13% 2035 Good 2025 19% 2025 Good
To demonstrate results more clearly, and to 
differentiate between the potential roles in each 
region, we have assigned scores to the duration 
of the relative and absolute bridges and the 
level of the maximum relative increase (if any). 
These criteria are set out in Table 13 and the 
values in Table 14 have been coloured to reflect 
these. Finally, the scores from each criterion are 
combined into a single value with equal weighting 
attached to each. The maximum score a region can 
thus achieve is six and the minimum zero.
We now interpret the role that natural gas can 
play in each region based on this total; this is also 
shown in Table 13. If a region scores five or more 
we conclude that there is an extended and strong 
role for natural to act as a bridge or transition 
fuel; if it scores either three or four then gas has 
a more diminished role in a decarbonised energy 
system but still maintains a good potential to act 
as a transition fuel; if it scores two or less then 
there is a very limited or no role of gas to act as a 
transition fuel. The qualitative description of the 
role gas can play is thus also included in Table 14. 
These are admittedly somewhat subjective criteria 
and scores, however they span the full range of 
results, and provide a good overview of the manner 
in which natural gas can be seen to be acting in 
each region in Figures 29 and 30. 
When CCS is available, natural gas plays an 
important or strong bridging role in four regions: 
China, Europe, India and Japan and South Korea. 
Its role as a transition fuel in the United States is 
also evident, but consumption falls in absolute 
terms from a relatively early stage. In contrast in 
Other Developing Asia and Australia, absolute gas 
consumption rises for a longer period than in the 
United States, but this drops below the growth 
in consumption in REF at an earlier stage. In the 
United States, Other Developing Asia and Australia, 
we therefore conclude that gas has good potential 
to act as a bridging fuel, but that this is more 
limited than in some other regions. 
In other regions, such as Africa, Central and 
South America, the Middle East and Mexico, gas 
consumption does continue to rise in 2DS out to 
late periods (after 2040). However, consumption 
rises faster in REF. Finally, in Canada and the 
Former Soviet Union, absolute consumption and 
relative is lower before 2035, and the maximum 
difference in consumption is very small.
We therefore interpret this to mean that pursuing 
policies encouraging the consumption of additional 
natural gas in these regions would be detrimental 
from a climate perspective and so gas has no or 
only a very limited potential to act as a transition 
fuel.
The influence of CCS is clear from Table 14; only in 
China does gas maintain its strong potential role 
when CCS is not available, indeed this role even 
appears to be strengthened. However, similar to the 
result at a global level, in nearly all other regions, 
despite the fact that the increase in consumption 
relative to REF is generally higher, the duration over 
which gas acts as a bridge is shortened. A number 
of the regions that had a ‘strong’ potential role for 
gas when CCS was available consequently drop 
down to mid-level. The only exception is Africa, 
which moves upwards. When CCS is not permitted, 
electricity generation from coal (which is 
predominantly in South Africa) ceases immediately 
in 2020 and is replaced by gas generation.
When CCS was permitted, the coal power plants 
continued operating until 2030 and so slightly less 
gas was required. It is again important to highlight 
that all of these results are dependent upon coal 
consumption dropping drastically from current 
levels in all regions. 
6.3  Effects of climate policy on shale gas 
production
The last area we examine is the effect that climate 
policy has on global shale gas production. Global 
shale gas production in each of the temperature 
scenario is given in Figure 31, which also contains 
the shale gas production projection from the latest 
IEA New Policies Scenario (IEA 2013c) for reference. 
As noted previously, the IEA indicates that this 
scenario is likely to lead to a long-term average 
3.6oC temperature rise. All scenarios can be seen 
to match closely the IEA projection up to the latest 
date given (2035). Indeed, REF, 3DS, and 2DS are 
broadly similar over the whole model horizon, with 
all three leading to global shale gas production 
that exceeds 1.4 Tcm by 2050.
When CCS is not permitted, the projection in shale 
gas production remains similar to the others up to 
2030 but thereafter remains steady at an average 
just under 700 Bcm/year. The main difference lies 
in production from Central and South America, 
where production grows out to 2030 but then 
declines to negligible levels rather than continuing 
to grow out to 2050, and Mexican production, 
which remains on a plateau of 35 Bcm/year rather 
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Figure 31. Global shale gas production in 
each scenario and projections from the 
latest IEA New Policies Scenario
than growing to over 200 Bcm/year by 2050 as in 
the other scenarios.
It should be noted that these results are very 
sensitive to the relative cost assumptions of 
shale gas compared with other conventional and 
unconventional sources. Further, we assume that 
fugitive emissions from shale gas production 
are only 5 per cent higher than the equivalent 
fugitive emissions for conventional production 
(these are emissions from production only and do 
not take account of the potential for the fugitive 
methane emission that occur during transport and 
distribution by pipeline as discussed in Section 
2.4.1). This is an area of ongoing controversy 
(see e.g. AEA 2012), but at present there are 
no sufficiently robust data to characterise this 
uncertainty to a suitable degree.
Shale gas production in the UK also remains largely 
unaffected by the emissions reduction target. In all 
scenarios production first commences in 2015 and 
grows to 6.5 Bcm in 2020. Thereafter production 
peaks at around 20 Bcm in 2030 before declining 
to negligible levels by 2040 as the assumed sweet 
spot areas become exhausted and it is more cost-
effective to import gas from elsewhere. The peak in 
production is, however, marginally higher (2 Bcm/
year) in both 2oC scenarios.
6.4  Summary of results
This section focussed on investigating the role of 
natural gas in a de-carbonised energy system. In 
a scenario that provides a 60 per cent chance of 
limiting the average surface temperature rise to 
2oC, gas consumption rises until 2035, and indeed 
is larger than in a case with no GHG emissions 
reductions on a global level between 2015 and 
2035. We therefore consider that there is a good 
potential for gas to act as a transition fuel to a low-
carbon future up to 2035. A number of important 
caveats were discussed to this, however.
First, the bridging period is strictly time-limited. 
Global gas consumption declines in all years after 
2035 whilst it continues to rise in scenarios leading 
to higher average temperature rises. Therefore any 
increase in near-term periods must be followed by 
a subsequent reduction in later periods; this will 
likely have a number of important business and 
policy implications.
Second, the absolute and relative increase in gas 
consumption (between the scenario limiting the 
temperature rise to 2oC and one with no GHG 
emissions reductions) must occur alongside a 
much greater reduction in coal consumption again 
in both absolute and relative terms. For example, 
in the 2oC scenario gas consumption increased 
by almost 15 per cent relative to the case with 
no GHG emission reductions (in 2025), but at the 
same time coal consumption was over 60 per cent 
lower, and fell to an average more than 80 per cent 
lower in all periods thereafter. This also has very 
important policy implications: any encouragement 
of gas to play a bridging role to a low-carbon, 
low-warming future must be accompanied 
by a stringent reduction in coal consumption, 
and its replacement by low-carbon, non-gas 
energy sources. Gas in this case is a short-term 
complement to the much larger increase in low-
carbon energy sources that needs to take place for 
the low-carbon transition actually to be achieved. 
Third, carbon capture and storage (CCS) is of 
particular importance. In a 2oC scenario in which 
CCS is not available, gas consumption peaked in 
2025 and declined terminally thereafter: the role 
that gas can as a transition fuel play was thus 
substantially reduced.
Fourth, our definition of the ‘relative’ bridging 
role that gas could play refers to the difference 
between a 2oC scenario and a scenario with 
no GHG emission reduction policies. In such a 
scenario there is a reversal of the trend that is 
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currently being exhibited in many regions away 
from coal-based power generation. A scenario with 
no GHG emissions reduction may not therefore 
be the best choice for comparison.  If a scenario is 
chosen that results in a lower temperature rise or 
contains a non-zero global CO2 tax, for example a 
3oC scenario, then the advantage (from a climate 
perspective) conveyed by consuming additional gas 
role is significantly lessened. 
The fifth and final caveat is that this global pattern 
was not exhibited by all regions, with gas able to 
play a bridging role in some regions but not in 
others. Of the 13 regions studied, gas had limited 
or no potential to act as a transition fuel in six 
(Africa, Canada, Central and South America, the 
Middle East and Mexico), a good potential in three 
(Australia, Other Developing Asia, and the United 
States), and a strong potential in four (China, 
Europe, India, and Japan and South Korea). Again 
this is dependent on the availability of CCS, with 
natural gas only remaining a strong bridge in 
China if CCS is not available. 
Finally, we found that there was very little 
difference in shale gas production levels under 
different long-term emissions mitigation targets. 
Production in a 2oC scenario was very similar to 
that in a 3oC scenario and indeed a 5oC scenario, 
exceeding 1 Tcm/year in all not long after 2040. 
However, in a 2oC scenario that did not allow CCS, 
shale gas grew to just under 700 Bcm/year by 2030, 
still a significant level of growth from present, but 
then remained at approximately this level until 
2050. These results are, however, sensitive to the 
relative cost assumptions of shale gas compared 
with other conventional and unconventional 
sources and to the assumed levels of fugitive 
emissions from shale gas production. This final 
issue is an area of particular ongoing controversy, 
but both areas require significant further research 
before it can really be concluded that shale gas has 
an important role to play in the transition to a low-
carbon global energy system.
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7
Conclusion and Wider 
Implications for Gas 
Markets
This project has brought together two strands 
of UK Energy Research Centre research: energy 
system modelling using the global TIAM-UCL 
model, and geopolitical economy research that has 
been examining the development of the global gas 
market. This enabled us to modify assumptions 
and characterise scenarios within the model to 
focus on the key drivers that will influence supply 
of and demand for natural gas in the future, and to 
explore its potential role as a bridging fuel. These 
drivers included:
1. the influence of market structure and the 
pricing of internationally traded gas on future 
supply, demand and trade;
2. the impact of climate change mitigation 
policies on future gas demand; and
3. the availability of carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) in both increasing and extending natural 
gas demand within the constraints of a 2oC 
mitigation strategy.
The analysis first indicated that natural gas can 
play an important role as a transition fuel to a 
low-carbon future on a global level. However, it 
highlighted that there are key regional differences 
in the potential for natural gas to perform this 
bridging role and that the window of opportunity 
offered by gas is strictly time-limited. Put simply, 
our findings suggest that – in a world where strong 
mitigation measures are taken to limit global 
warming to 2oC – it won’t be a golden age for gas 
everywhere and it won’t be long before natural 
gas consumption becomes part of the problem 
rather than part of the solution. This final section 
considers the wider implications of the project’s 
findings in relation to the three drivers identified 
above.
The findings of our research suggest that global 
price formation convergence is necessary to 
promote increased natural gas consumption 
and international trade. By this we do not mean 
that the price of natural gas will be the same 
in the major regional markets (North America, 
Europe and the Asia-Pacific), rather that gas price 
formation in these markets will be based on gas-
to-gas competition and the laws of supply and 
demand. This is not the case at the moment and 
this helps to explain the significant levels of price 
divergence that we see at present.
The price will not be same in each regional 
market as it will reflect differences in production 
costs, scarcity rents and transport costs. Thus, 
for example, LNG prices will likely remain higher 
because of the capital intensity of the supply chain 
and the costs of liquefaction and transportation. 
The key point is that this ‘global’ price results 
in a lower gas price in key markets – such as 
China – where gas demand can only grow if it 
is competitive with coal in power generation. 
Similarly, in Europe pipeline gas must be able 
to compete against coal (in the absence of an 
effective carbon trading system). Put another way, 
in both instances, oil indexation – under present 
market conditions – results in too high a gas 
price in key markets. At present, the position of 
key gas exporters, such as Russia and the other 
members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, is 
to defend oil-indexation in the belief that this will 
protect short-term revenues. Our analysis suggests 
that in the longer-term this is self-defeating, as 
it will constrain demand for natural gas. This is 
particularly the case for LNG that is aimed at those 
emerging Asian economies that might otherwise 
consume a lot more coal.
It is, however, also worth noting that regardless 
of how gas is priced in the future, when GHG 
emissions reductions are taken seriously, pipeline 
and LNG exports are larger, and often much larger, 
than when GHG emissions are ignored. Gas-
exporting countries should therefore note that 
actively pursuing an ambitious global agreement 
on emissions reduction could be a beneficial and 
worthwhile method by which they could open new 
markets and increase export levels in the future.
This leads onto another key result, which is 
that strong climate change mitigation polices 
promote increased gas demand in the near term. 
This is because the focus of early mitigation is 
on removing coal from the energy mix. However, 
there comes a time, which varies dependent on 
the level of carbon tax and the region in question, 
when natural gas itself must be removed from the 
energy mix because GHG emissions are no longer 
compliant with reduction targets. Thus, sometime 
between the 2020’s and 2030’s there will no longer 
be a role for substantial amounts of unabated gas 
power generation.
In mature markets, where gas is part of base 
load, it is understood that the role of natural gas 
must rapidly evolve to being primarily a backup 
for renewable intermittency. In such a context 
significant gas power generation capacity remains 
online, but the load on that capacity is significantly 
reduced. At the same time, residential use of gas 
for cooking and heating must be replaced by low 
carbon electricity.
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In emerging markets, where the hope is that new 
gas power generation is constructed instead of 
coal, it may be that that capacity will have to be 
retired long before it becomes obsolete. The fear 
of some is that building that capacity to meet the 
relatively short-lived ‘bridging’ role will lock in a 
higher carbon energy mix since industry will not 
retire serviceable equipment. However, it is worth 
noting that industry is already having to do this to 
coal-fired plant in Europe under pollution control 
directives.
What is therefore required is a ‘gas-by-design’ 
approach. This would understand the time-
constrained role for natural gas in the low-carbon 
transition and so create a business model that 
enables sufficient investment in gas power 
capacity while it is needed, but also ensure that it 
is withdrawn when it is no longer consistent with 
emissions targets and/or modified such that it 
runs as back up for renewables. Such an approach 
would also provide some insurance against a 
failure to build sufficient low-carbon capacity in 
time.
The final key finding of our analysis is the critical 
role of CCS. Simply put, the large-scale commercial 
deployment of CCS enables gas to remain in the 
power generation mix and in the industrial sector 
for much longer, and so allows higher absolute 
levels of gas consumption. Furthermore, there 
are a number of regions where CCS is crucial for 
gas to play a bridging role. This suggests that the 
gas industry and gas exporting and consuming 
countries should make much greater efforts to 
bring flexible gas power with CCS to market as 
soon as possible. The only caveat is that CCS can 
also be fitted to coal-fired power stations; however, 
there is much more carbon to be captured and 
stored in the case of coal. 
This analysis has been global in scope and as such 
is a broad-brush approach to the prospects for 
natural gas to play a role as a bridge to a low carbon 
future. It identifies significant limitations to that 
role and suggests key factors that could increase 
future gas demand and international trade. We 
have not examined the case of the UK in any detail. 
The next stage in our research is to ask the same 
questions using a model appropriate to the UK. 
Earlier UKERC research (Skea et al. 2011) suggests 
a modest role for gas in the future. These findings 
require renewed scrutiny given the assertions that 
shale gas development in the UK is consistent with 
our climate change policy.
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Existing regional electricity generation and primary energy supply shares
Africa – AFR; Australia and New Zealand – AUS; Canada – CAN; Central and South America –CSA; 
China – CHI; Europe – EUR; Former Soviet Union – FSU; India – IND; Japan and South Korea – JAP 
& SKO; Mexico – MEX; Middle East – MEA; Other Developing Asia – ODA ; United States – USA.
Electricity generation shares in 2011
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